Rhetoric and Its Influence

Rhetoric which originally was an ancient art of argument and speech making stands by itself as a sphere of activity even today because it is an activity with an end in itself or the artifice of making a use of language persuasive and influential. Since no serious consideration of “rhetoric is conceivable without reference to the rhetoric of classical antiquity” (Zabulis, 1995), the consideration of rhetoric in the present chapter will not avoid this reference. Apart from this, rhetoric will be treated as a use of language to preserve the general focus of the present work.

The Mixed Uses of Language. Rhetoric

Although the referential use of language has been described as a pure use of language, there are a few instances of this use of language in actual texts in which it differs from other uses of language. For scholarly purposes and for the purpose of clarity, a use of language may be described as an independent branch in verbal communication. But it is very difficult to find pure manifestations of concrete uses of language. It has been acknowledged in the most reliable and up-to-date sources that “adult utterances are functionally complex” and they are “serving more than one function at the same time” (Halliday, 1976, 18). For the same reason, it is almost impossible to identify an adult use of language without emotive elements or without instances of phatic, metalingual and other elements mixed in it. In some fields mixed uses of language dominate so as to become a phenomenon in its own right. One of the spheres of such language use is rhetoric.

Rhetoric as an expression of a certain function or a certain form of the artistically used word (Zabulis, 1995, I) is a mixed use of language. Indeed, if rhetoric is a verbal function, it may be bound to various kinds of content. Aristotle, for example, distinguished political, forensic and ceremonial oratory and considered it to have a function different from all other arts. This function is persuasion. “Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter... But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric. Bk. I, Ch.2, 1355b, 26-36).

Modern scholars, too, found the above mentioned three kinds of rhetoric the principal kinds of rhetoric - genus symbouleutikon, genus dicanicon and genus epideicticon (Zabulis, 1995, III). The mixed character of speech in rhetoric is confirmed by its definition. To Plato rhetoric was the verbal art of creating persuasion (Zabulis, 1995, I) or the true and persuading art of oratory (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 269d). Aristotle maintained that rhetoric may be defined as “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 2, 1355b, 25-26). Donald Davidson, a contemporary author of an exhaustive manual of American Rhetoric and Composition found that “rhetoric refers to the skill and artifice used in making the composition persuasive and effective” (Davidson, 1968, 2). Two famous authors Brooks and Warren defined rhetoric as “the art of using language effectively” (Brooks, Warren, 1961, 2), while Gerald Levin found rhetoric to be “the art of effective expression” (Levin, 1966, 3). As is evident, the concept of rhetoric has changed but little since the classical antiquity, when it was “a discipline concerned with the skills of public speaking as a means of persuasion” (Wales, 1991, 405-406).

In his dialogue Phaedrus , Plato has Socrates considering the achievement of excellent and persuasive speeches, their composition and the art of the speaker himself. In this dialogue, Socrates is of the opinion that whoever treats the art of oratory seriously will first of all consider the soul of the listener and the kinds of the souls the speaker intends to address (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 271a). The idea is to explicate the nature of the souls and to find out what may be appealing to different kinds of souls, what would persuade one kind of soul and fail with another (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 271b-e). Consequently, the orator should carefully employ all the kinds of speeches he had mastered (the concise, the grievious and the intimidating) as they would befit the occasion (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 272a), for his chief aim is to be successful in persuasion.

Making references to and mentioning the names of the famous orators of his time, such as Pericles, Teisias, Gorgias, Trasymachus, Lysias and others, Plato has Socrates assuming that speeches must be of a uniform composition (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 269c), of moderate length (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 267b) and be marked by other subtleties. Speeches must have an introduction, an exposition, witnesses and testimony, credible reasoning and reiterated confirmation (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 266d-e, 267a). Plato has Socrates mentioning the correctness of a speech (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 267c), the use of contrast, of exaggeration and belittling, of sayings and images (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 267a-b,267c) as major verbal subtleties in speeches.

In Plato’s dialogue Phaedrus, Socrates considers rhetoric to depend significantly on the inborn talent of the speaker, which may be improved by training (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 269d). He also mentions the individual achievements of such orators as Adrastos and Pericles. Their achievement was a concise and imaginative speech, and vivid consideration (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 269a). Thus Plato puts forward the talent and personality of the orator himself in successful rhetoric.

The classical rhetoric developed its kinds and features drawing on actual life experience and on its actual application. Modern rhetoric, at least in the way it is presented in college manuals (Davidson, 1968; Brooks, Warren, 1961; Levin, 1966), has significantly lost its extralinguistic context and focuses mainly on the discussion, the distribution and the use of various verbal means. It is only those modern authors who are familiar with the classical rhetoric that require the employment of extralinguistic topics relevant to the students’ use (Davidson, 1968, 3-5; Brooks, Warren, 1961, 5-6). Otherwise the sole emphasis is on language, especially how it may be manipulated “to convey the proper attitude in a given situation” so as to gain “a real command of the language”, which is “a powerful means for improving our relations with other people” (Brooks, Warren, 1961, 4; cf.: Corbett, Connors, 1999). Thus, since in modern times the effective and persuasive use of language appears as the sole reason and the aim in rhetoric, the real circumstances which conditioned the development of the classical rhetoric and of its features should be considered first. Moreover, there exists even an assumption among scholars that no credible consideration of rhetoric may be presented without reference to the classics (cf.: Connolly, Levin, 1968, 327-412; Zabulis, 1995, I).

The few definitions given above point to persuasion as the essential aim in rhetoric. Therefore modes of persuasion is the most relevant question here. Modes of persuasion and proof were of the greatest concern to Aristotle: “The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric. Bk. I, Ch. 1, 1354a, 10-15), or “rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric. Bk. I, Ch.1, 1355a, 3-4). By the modes of persuasion Aristotle meant “skill in enthymemes (enqumhmaς)”56 (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk I, Ch.1, 1354b, 20-22), because “enthymemes... are the substance of rhetorical persuasion”57 (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. 1, Ch.1, 1354a, 15).

Persuasion in rhetoric is achieved by proof or apparent proof which is made active by induction, syllogism and enthymeme (Aristotle, 1954. Rhetoric, Bk.1, Ch.2, 1356b, 1-5). The example is an induction, the enthymeme is a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme is an apparent syllogism. Aristotle calls the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction. According to Aristotle, there is no other way to effect persuasion through proof than by way of using enthymemes or examples (Aristotle, 1954. Rhetoric, Bk.1, Ch.2, 1356b, 1-15).

The enthymeme is a sort of syllogism, (in which one of the premises is not explicitly stated) (Blackburn, 1996, 121), and a consideration of syllogisms of all kinds is the business of dialectic. In this rhetoric approximates dialectic. He who is best able to see how and from what elements a syllogism is produced is best skilled in the enthymeme. But such a person has also to be aware of his subject matter and of the difference between the enthymeme and the syllogism of strict logic. The same faculty leads to the apprehension of the true and the approximately true. Men usually have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true and do arrive at the truth. In political oratory and, partly, in forensic oratory, a good guess at probabilities is required, and the one who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities. (Aristotle, 1954. Rhetoric, Bk.1, Ch.1, 1355a, 7-18). Speeches that rely on examples are as persuasive as those that rely on enthymemes, but those that rely on enthymemes are better received.

To define the process more clearly is to say that individual cases are not taken into account in reasoning in rhetoric. Rhetoric draws upon the regular subjects of debate. The subjects of deliberation in rhetoric are such as seem to present the audience with alternative possibilities of reasoning, to simplify a complicated argument or a long chain of reasoning (Aristotle, 1954. Rhetoric, Bk.1, Ch.2, 1357a, 4-5).

The materials of enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs, which must correspond with the propositions that are generally and those that are necessarily true. A probability is a thing that usually happens. It bears the same relation to that in respect of which it is probable as the universal bears to the particular. Signs are of two kinds: one bears the same relation to the statement it supports as the particular bears to the universal, the other bears the same relation as the universal bears to the particular. The infallible kind is a 'complete proof’ (tekhrion); and the fallible kind has no specific name. Infallible signs are those on which syllogisms proper may be based. If what is said cannot be refuted by counter statement, it is a sign and a complete proof (Aristotle, 1954. Rhetoric, Bk.1, Ch.2, 1357a, 32-40, 1357b, 1-20).

There is an important distinction between two sorts of enthymemes, which also exists between the syllogisms in dialectic. One sort of enthymeme really belongs to rhetoric and one sort of syllogism really belongs to dialectic. But there is another sort of enthymeme and syllogism which belong to other arts and faculties, whether to those we are familiar or not familiar with. Missing this distinction, people fail to notice that the more correctly they handle their particular subject, the further they are getting away from pure rhetoric or dialectic.

The proper subjects of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are the things with which the regular or universal lines of argument are concerned. It is those lines of argument that apply equally to questions of right conduct, natural science, politics and many other spheres which may have nothing to do with one another. But there are also special lines of argument which are based on such propositions that apply only to particular groups or classes of things. These may be propositions about natural science, for example, on which it is impossible to base any enthymeme or syllogism about ethics. The same principle applies to all other spheres. The general lines of argument have no special subject matter and do not increase one’s understanding about any particular class of things. When the selection of propositions suitable for special lines of argument is specified, one comes nearer to setting up a science distinct from dialectic and rhetoric.

Most enthymemes are based upon the particular or special lines of argument; comparatively few are based on the common or general lines of argument. In dealing with enthymemes, one should distinguish the special and the general lines of argument on which they are based. Propositions peculiar to each of several classes of things make up the special lines of argument, while those common to all classes alike make up the general lines of argument (Aristotle, 1954. Rhetoric, Bk.1, Ch.2, 1358a, 3-35). In all kinds of rhetoric, whether political, forensic or ceremonial, these two lines of argument may be developed and should be preferably observed.

Of the three elements in speech making - the speaker, the subject and the person addressed, it is the last one, that is the hearer, which determines the speech’s end and object. Depending on the hearer, modes of persuasion and proof are chosen. Depending on the spheres in which rhetoric had a function, three divisions of rhetoric - political, forensic and ceremonial, are set by Aristotle. The spheres of activity were so bound up with rhetoric that it was assumed that, for example, all legal practice was formed in rhetoric in the classical times (Zabulis, 1995, III). The reasoning by the enthymeme and the syllogism is essential in forensic rhetoric. In modern rhetoric, which is mostly political and ceremonial, with forensic rhetoric kept up only in some countries, reasoning by the syllogism and example is most widely used. Such reasoning is most effective when it is covert and when examples lead the audience, as is the case in President John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address, which is to be considered further on.

Rhetoric is truly a mixed use of language. It does not only stretch over several spheres of activity such as law, social life and political engagements, but covers a wide range of topics within each. Summarising briefly, it would be accusation and defence in all the unpredictable variety of legal cases in law, praise and blame on all occasions imaginable in ceremonial oratory of display, and ways and means, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and legislation in politics.

Rhetoric is also a mixed use of language because emotions of the hearers matter in it, and speakers deliberately exploit emotions and emotive attitudes of the audience to have its favourable reaction and support. Plato’s concern with the soul of the hearer is relevant in this connection: the better the speaker understands the soul of the person addressed, the more effective his rhetoric may be (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 271a-e).

Although criticising writers on rhetoric of his day who “direct the whole of their efforts” to the stirring of different emotions in the listeners, Aristotle did not deny the presence of different emotions which affect judgements. Moreover, he considered persuasion coming through the hearers, “when speech stirs their emotions” as a second mode of persuasion, which is especially effective when the speaker’s character is good and he may use “the most effective means of persuasion he possesses” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk.1, Ch.2, 1356a, 13-15).

Emotions also figure in the consideration of the three modes of persuasion, i.e. the personal character of the speaker, putting the audience into a certain frame of mind, and the proof or apparent proof provided by the words of the speech itself (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk.1, Ch.2, 1356a, 1-5). To be in command of these means, the man must be able “to reason logically, to understand human character and goodness in their various forms and to understand the emotions - that is to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the ways in which they are excited” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk.1, Ch.2, 1356a, 21-25).

The role of emotions appears most important when it comes to a consideration of the question of how the hearers may be put into the right frame of mind, because rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions, and it is the hearers who are to give them depending on their disposition. Good will and friendliness are required from the hearers before they may be trusted. In this connection, Aristotle defines and discusses a number of emotions, such as anger and calmness, friendship and enmity, fear, shame and shamelessness, kindness, pity, indignation, envy and emulation most exhaustively. Three aspects of every emotion are considered. In the case of anger, for example, Aristotle analyses (1) the frame of mind of angry people, (2) the people with whom they are angry, and (3)the reasons of their anger. He considers all the points so important that, unless we know all three, we shall be unable to arouse anger in any one when speaking. The same is true of other emotions. Good will and friendliness of disposition form part of Aristotle’s discussion of emotions.

In modern rhetoric, too, feelings and emotions are touched upon in connection with the use of language (cf.: Brooks, Warren, 1961, 3-4). First, Brooks and Warren consider feelings as part of human experience and how they affect the harmony of man’s existence. Second, they consider how useful language is to express emotions and to discriminate shades of feeling. Third, these authors focus on how an individual deals with the feelings of other people and makes his own feelings understood by others. This confirms that the emotive use of language is no less important in rhetoric than the referential use of language. Before it influences the judgement of the hearers, the emotive use of language plays a role in arresting the hearers’ attention and in securing their continuous participation. The emotive use of language in rhetoric is also very important because the speech lasts only a short time and the hearers’ reaction has to be simultaneous. Mainly because in rhetoric the referential use of language intertwines closely with the emotive use of language, while the latter enhances the result and the effect, rhetoric is a mixed use of language.

Kinds of Rhetoric and Its General Principles

Though rhetoric and especially its integrity in extralinguistic spheres of activity have changed since the classical antiquity, the classical kinds of rhetoric have remained practised to this day. In this section therefore I shall consider the kinds of rhetoric defined by Aristotle. The order of significance will be reversed, though, to do away with the ceremonial oratory first as a minor kind and to focus the attention on political and forensic speaking as the major kinds of rhetoric.

The ceremonial oratory of display is the kind of oratory which praises or censures somebody. It is the oratory of eulogy or reproof. Aristotle described this kind of oratory in detail. The ceremonial oratory is concerned with the present. He who praises or attacks a man aims at proving him worthy of honour or the reverse. He also treats all other considerations with reference to this one. Like the political or the forensic speaker, the ceremonial orator should have at his command propositions about the possible or the impossible, about the greatness or smallness of things, about virtue, about the noble and the base, because these are the truest and credible objects of praise and blame.

Praise may be serious or frivolous, but, whichever the case, audience comes before the subject of praise. When one attempts to praise a man or blame him, one has to take into account the nature of a particular audience, because it is the audience who is to believe or not to believe the speaker and accept his words as convincing or not. If the audience esteems a particular quality, the speaker is likely to have more success if he says that his hero has that quality. Since praise is the expression in words of the eminence of a man’s good qualities, his actions must be displayed as the product of such qualities. This is one of the cases in ceremonial oratory which suggests the need and possibility for the use of enthymemes rather than simple examplifying or enumeration.

Encomium, which is high praise, refers to what the person has actually done. The mention of accessories, such as good birth and education, for example, merely helps to make the story credible. Therefore it is only when a man has already done something that encomiums are bestowed upon him. The actual deeds are the evidence of the doer’s character, but there may be occasions when praise is bestowed on a man, even if he has not actually done a given good thing. If the speaker is sure that he is the sort of man who would do it, he can put forward praise for that quality. The argument, however, has to be respectively modified.

Since a man is usually praised for what he has actually done, attempts must be made to prove that the person’s noble acts are intentional, because fine actions are distinguished from others by being intentionally good. This is not difficult to do if the speaker can make out that the person has often acted so before. Thus coincidences and accidents must be asserted to have been intended and proving the good qualities of the man who did them.

To praise a man is partly akin to urging a course of action. The ceremonial speaker therefore has to bear in mind the line of his argument and argue respectively. The meaning of encomiums in this case depends on how they are expressed. When the speaker knows what action or character is required, then in order to express these facts as suggestions for action, he has to change and reverse the form of words. For example, the statement 'A man should be proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself’ amounts to a suggestion in the present wording. To turn it into praise, it must be put thus: 'Since he is proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself’. Consequently, desiring to praise any one, the speaker should think what he would urge people to do. If he wants to urge the doing of anything, he must think what he would praise a man for having done. Since suggestion may or may not forbid an action, the praise into which the speaker converts it must have one or the other of the two opposite forms of expression accordingly.

There are many useful ways of heightening the effect of praise. Mention must always be made of honourable distinctions. Thus it must be mentioned that the man was the first or the only one to do something or that he has done it better than any one else. If a man has often achieved the same success, this should be mentioned as a strong point: he himself, and not luck, will then be given the credit. The impression on the audience will be all the stronger. Bad men may be censured for the opposite reason.

If it is difficult to find enough to say of the man himself, he may be put against others for comparison. The comparison should be with famous men because this can strengthen the effect: it is a noble thing to surpass men who are themselves great. Aristotle considers that any superiority is a form of nobleness. Therefore if the speaker cannot compare his hero with famous men, he should at least compare him with other people generally, since any superiority is held to reveal excellence. This 'heightening of effect’ is most suitable for declamations, in which the hero’s actions are taken as admitted facts, and the speaker has to invest them with dignity and nobility. Such are the general lines on which most speeches of praise and blame are constructed according to Aristotle.

Since the listeners for whom such a speech is put together are treated as judges of it, the persuasive force of speech must be on their side. Since each of the main divisions of oratory has its own distinct purpose, ceremonial oratory has its purpose too: it is to praise or censure a man convincingly to the listening audience. The arguments common to all oratory and, especially, to the use of enthymeme are treated together in the final section of this review.

Political oratory is advisory oratory. Political speaking urges the hearers either to do or not to do something. Therefore the political orator is concerned with the future: it is about things to be done hereafter that he advises, for or against. The political orator aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action; if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will be good; if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it will do harm. He brings in all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, as relative to his main consideration.

First Aristotle considers the kinds of things, good or bad, about which the political orator offers counsel. He does not deal with all things, but only with such as may or may not take place. The treatment by class is also excluded because a class would include some good things that occur naturally, and some that occur by accident. It is useless to offer counsel about these. In political oratory, counsel can only be given on matters about which people deliberate, matters that ultimately depend on ourselves, and which we have it in our power to get going.

An accurate enumeration and classification of the usual subjects of public business and their framing together with definitions is not a task that falls in the sphere of rhetoric. The fact is that rhetoric, which is a combination of the science of logic and of the ethical branch of politics, is partly like dialectic and partly like sophistic reasoning. Any more deeper or profounder consideration of practical faculties would lead one to the sphere of science dealing with definite subjects rather than simply with words and forms of reasoning. It is sufficient, for Aristotle, to say that the main matters on which men deliberate, on which political speakers make speeches and offer advice are some five in number: ways and means, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and legislation.

The political speaker should know very well the state of the art for all the subjects mentioned at a given moment and their history in the country and the state of the related subjects in the foreign lands. He should be able to see the useful side of them and to reason to advise wisely because his advice concerns his own interests. In matters of legislation, it is useful for the speaker to study the past history of his own country at the given moment, and to study even books of travel and other useful aids to legislation. He may find researches of historians useful, but he has to remember that these are the business of political science, not rhetoric, while his business is rhetoric.

The political speaker must argue in favour of adopting or rejecting measures regarding the matters mentioned above from certain premises which are common human interests. It may be said that every individual man and all men in common generally aim at a certain end which determines what they prefer and what they avoid. Putting it briefly, this end may be said to be happiness and its constituents. After this statement, Aristotle turns to a detailed consideration of the nature of happiness and of the elements of its constituent parts.

Having defined happiness as “prosperity combined with virtue; or as independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition of property and body, together with the power of guarding one’s property or body and making use of them” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 5, 1360b, 14-18), Aristotle concludes that virtually everybody agrees that happiness is one or more of these things. Then he considers well over ten constituents of happiness, such as good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, also such bodily excellences as health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic powers, together with fame, honour, good luck and virtue. Aristotle reasons that if man possesses these internal and external goods, he can be completely independent, for besides these there are no others to have. It is true, to make his life really secure, man should possess resources and luck. Then Aristotle turns to the definitions and features of the constituents of happiness.

Specifying further, the political or deliberative orator’s aim is utility because deliberation seeks to determine not ends but the means to ends, i.e. what it is most useful to do. Thus it becomes relevant for Aristotle to turn to a consideration of the main facts about Goodness and Utility in general. He concludes that positive goodness and badness are more important than the mere absence of goodness and badness, for positive goodness and badness are ends and may be the aim in oratory, while the mere absence of them cannot be the end. The idea of a lengthy consideration of relative goodness and badness is to show the grounds on which arguments should be based.

The most important and effective qualification for success in persuading audiences and speaking well on public affairs is to understand all forms of government and to discriminate their respective customs, institutions and interests, for men’s interest lies, according to Aristotle, in the maintenance of the established order. This consideration of the objects, immediate or distant, was to clarify the grounds for Aristotle, on which the political speaker is to base his arguments in favour of their utility.

Goodness has another aspect in its rhetorical significance. Given all the knowledge of the state and its institutions, rhetorical arguments could not be successfully effectuated only by demonstrative means. There is the ethical side of the argument, too. The speaker can convince his listeners more successfully if they believe that he has certain qualities of character himself, for example, goodness, or goodwill towards the hearers, or both together. Similarly, they may desire to know the moral qualities characteristic of each form of government. These are learned the same way as the qualities of individuals.

In addition to goodness, Aristotle considers virtue. Virtue, like goodness has several forms. Among those forms of virtue mentioned by Aristotle, are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence and wisdom. The noble and the virtuous have common features and common forms in Aristotle’s understanding. Therefore if the orator impresses his hearers of his own nobleness and virtue, he wins their special favour and trust. This is part of the question of the personal character of the speaker. It is also part of the question of how it is possible to put the hearers in the right frame of mind. It is particularly important in political speaking that the orator’s own character should look right (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk.II, Ch.1, 28-30).

Since “rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions” - the hearers decide between one political speaker and another, and a legal verdict is a decision - “the orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put the hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. II, Ch.1, 22-30). Goodness, the idea of it and its relation with virtue as the sources of the impression of the speaker’s character have already been mentioned. Good will and friendliness of disposition are significant in the hearers’ emotions. “Since emotions are those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk.II, Ch.1, 20-22), the speaker has to guard himself from arousing unfavourable emotions in his listeners. Aristotle considers the principal emotions in detail in Chapters 2-11 of Book II of Rhetoric, focusing on three aspects: 1)the state of mind in which a person is moved to a certain emotion, 2)the people with whom a person usually experiences the emotion, and 3)the grounds on which the person is aroused to the emotion. Knowing how goodness as virtue makes the impression allows the speaker to present his own character in the right way, while knowing the sources of unfavourable emotions allows him to put the hearers into the right frame of mind so that their decisions would be favourable.

Of two general modes of persuasion - the example and the enthymeme, the example is most suitable to deliberative, i.e. political, speeches, because the hearers judge of future events by divination from past events (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, CH. 9, 29-31). Enthymemes and maxims, which are a form of the enthymeme, are also useful in political oratory, but less than in forensic oratory. There are numerous questions, especially those of the use of words and different forms of reasoning, which are common to all forms of rhetoric. These will be considered after features of forensic oratory are described. Although political oratory is a nobler business than forensic speaking and fitter for a citizen than that which concerns the relations of private individuals, the same systematic principles apply both to political and forensic oratory.

Forensic speaking is the speech of arguments. In forensic speaking the orator either attacks or defends somebody, i.e. he formulates cases and gives his arguments for somebody’s indictment or defence. Therefore argumentation should be the strong point in forensic oratory.

The forensic speaker is concerned with the past. Even modern lawyers refuse to consider probable actions. They say they can consider the case only when it is based on fact. Parties in a law-case aim at establishing the justice or injustice of some action. This is their principal subject and the matter which the forensic speaker pursues to prove. They bring in all other points as subsidiary and relative to this one. The forensic speaker attempts to give arguments not on the account why something could have happened but that it did happen. That is why the forensic speaker’s proper mode of persuasion is the enthymeme.

The role of the forensic speaker is very peculiar. Every case has the two approaches - indictment and defence. There are laws also, and it is generally required that laws would be well-drawn so that should themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision of the judges. Although laws may be well drawn and made after long considerations to be prospective and general, the position of the judges is challenging: the judges are few in law court cases, decisions in the courts are given at a short notice, and the judge and the jury find it their duty to decide on definite cases brought before them. It is not infrequently that the judges will have allowed themselves to be influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self-interest so as to lose a clear vision of the truth and have their judgement obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain. Although the judge should be allowed to decide as few things as possible, there are always questions which the law-giver could not have foreseen. These are questions whether something has happened or has not, whether it is or is not. The state and argumentation of these questions is the business of the forensic speaker. Aristotle criticises such speakers who speak to arouse prejudice, pity, anger and similar emotions as having nothing to do with the essential facts but merely stimulating a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case.

Aristotle argues that rhetoric is useful and this applies mainly to forensic speaking. He maintains that things that are true and just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of the judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves. In such circumstances they merit blame respectively. There may be audiences whom it may be difficult to convince even in possession of the exactest knowledge, because there are people whom one cannot instruct, although argument based on knowledge requires instruction. In such cases the speaker should turn to the modes of persuasion and argument possessed by everybody to handle a popular audience.

The speaker must be able to employ persuasion on opposite sides of a question, not in order to be practised in both ways, but in order to see clearly what the facts are and be able to confute the opponent if he argues unfairly. Only two arts draw opposite conclusions - dialectic and rhetoric. They both draw opposite conclusions impartially.

There is one more point to be made. It is of the just and unjust use of speech in accusation and defence. Aristotle considers absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs. If it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that would be a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful, such as strength, health, wealth and generalship. The one who uses these can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use, and inflict the greatest injuries by using them wrongly.

Turning to treat the speech of accusation and defence, Aristotle intends to enumerate and describe the ingredients of the syllogisms used herein. But first it appears that three things have to be determined: first, the nature and number of the incentives to wrong-doing; second, the state of mind of wrong-doers; and third, the kind of persons who are wronged and their condition58 .

‘Wrong-doing’ is defined by Aristotle as injury voluntary inflicted and contrary to law. ‘Voluntarily inflicted’ means done consciously and without constraint. Deliberately harmful and wicked acts contrary to law are due to 1)vice, and 2)lack of self-control. The point is that the wrongs a man does to others will correspond to the bad quality or qualities that he himself possesses. Any wrong that any one does to others corresponds to his particular faults of character (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk.I, Ch. 10, 13-15, 23-24).

Since faults of character are discussed together with virtues (Rhetoric, Bk.I, Ch.9) and are further treated with emotions (Rhetoric, Bk. II, Ch. 1-12), there remains two points to consider, viz. the motives and states of mind of wrong-doers, and to whom they do wrong. Here Aristotle turns to the following reasoning. Every action of every person either is or is not due to that person himself. Some of those actions that are not due to the person himself are due to chance, the others to necessity and, of these latter, some are due to compulsion and the others to nature. Consequently, all actions that are not due to man himself, i.e. are involuntary, are due either to chance, or to nature or to compulsion (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 10, 27-37). The actions that are due to man himself are due either to habit or to rational or irrational craving. Rational craving is a wish or desire for something that is considered good, while irrational craving encompasses anger and appetite. Thus, habit, reasoning, anger and appetite cause voluntary actions.

Putting it all together, every action must be due to one or other of the seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger or appetite. In a minor digression from the above intention, Aristotle considers why various actions lead to certain causes. Most of the things that lead to a violation of the accepted order or to crime arise from appetite in seeking pleasure. But there is the healthy and the unhealthy appetite. This depends on man’s character. The temperate man is always and at once attended by healthy opinions and appetites because he is temperate, while the intemperate man is attended by unhealthy appetites.

There are certain kinds of actions and certain kind of people that usually go together. The fact is that though there is no kind of action that would associate with men because of their physical features, there is the difference if the man is young or old, just or unjust. All the accessory qualities that cause distinctions of human character are thus important, because they may or may not influence the action.

To continue to summarise the circumstances under which men do wrong to others, involuntary and voluntary actions are important. The things that happen by chance are those that cannot be determined, that have no purpose and that happen neither always nor usually nor in any fixed way. The things that happen by nature have a fixed and internal cause; they take place uniformly, either always or usually. There is no need to discuss things that happen contrary to nature because chance would seem at least partly the cause of such events. The things that happen through compulsion are those which take place contrary to the desire or reason of the doer, yet through his own agency. There remain the voluntary actions or things done through habit, reasoning, anger, and appetite.

People do things from habit because they have often done them before. Actions are due to reasoning when in view of anything that is considered good (see p.7, above), they appear useful either as ends or as means to an end, and are performed for that reason. To passion and anger are due all acts of revenge. Acts of revenge are inflicted for the sake of the punisher, to satisfy his feelings. Appetite is the cause of all actions that appear pleasant. To sum it up, all actions due to the doers either are or seem to be good or pleasant. This means that all voluntary actions must either be or seem to be either good or pleasant. Good are usually useful and they have been considered in a separate chapter by Aristotle (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk.I, Ch.6). There remain pleasant things. By reviewing pleasure and the pleasant Aristotle finds the motives that make men do wrong to others

Good, useful, and pleasant things possessed by somebody may be the incentives to crimes or to doing wrong to those possessing them. The states of mind in which wrong is done and those to whom it is done is the next step in Aristotle’s consideration. The thought that the thing can be done and done by him must be principal in the wrong-doer’s mind. There are three main reasons why men engage in wrong-doing: 1)they think they can do it without being found out; 2)if they are found out, they can escape being punished; 3)if they are punished, the disadvantage will be less than the gain for themselves or those they care for (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 12, 5-8). Aristotle’s analysis of the actual states of mind of the wrong-doer implies that the wrong-doer sees and hopes for an escape in all circumstances, or that the case he “had failed to do right rather than actually done wrong” might be formulated for him (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 12, 1372b, 19-20).

As to men to whom wrong is done, the statement will be brief in this summary. Before reviewing different kinds of people for their character traits or habits, or turns of behaviour in cases of crime, Aristotle states that the people to whom wrong is done “are those who have what the wrong-doer wants himself, whether this means necessities or luxuries and materials for enjoyment” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 12, 1372b, 23-26). Since this seems to be the principal reason of assault and since it is in our interests to shorten the questions of legal matters for the questions of language, the question of men to whom wrong is done is cut short.

In completing his classification of just and unjust actions, Aristotle observes that such actions have been defined relatively to two kinds of law, to particular law and universal law. “Particular law is that which each community lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten. Universal law is the law of nature. For there really is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or convenant with each other” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 13, 1373b, 3-8). Having confirmed his definition with reference to the words of Sophocles’s Antigone and with those of a few philosophers, Aristotle turns to a classification of just and unjust actions performed towards one definite person, or towards the community. Then he specifies the meaning of ‘being wronged’ as implying somebody (1)suffering actual harm and (2)suffering against his will. Aristotle further notices that every accusation must be of an action affecting either the community or some individual and deals specifically with a delicate verbal question of the accusation when the wrong-doer admits the action in his own terms, but resists admitting it in the lawyer’s terms. When grievous charges are brought against a man, the question is whether he is or is not guilty of a criminal offence, and the lawyer’s terms become particularly important, of which Aristotle supplies examples.

Reconsidering the kinds of right and wrong conduct towards others, provided for by written and unwritten ordinances, Aristotle introduces equity as a kind of ordinance which “makes up for the defects of a community’s written code of law” (Aristotle, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 13, 25-26). Having exemplified how equity applies to forgivable actions, Aristotle lays emphasis on the moral aspect of mercy and considerateness encompassed by equity in settling a dispute by negotiation and preferring arbitration to litigation.

The so-called ‘non-technical’ means of persuasion characteristic of forensic oratory are five in number: laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures and oaths. All these concerning specific legal matters, witnesses deserve attention in Aristotle’s consideration. To Aristotle, witnesses are essentially of two kinds - the ancient and the recent. ‘Ancient’ witnesses are “the poets and all other notable persons whose judgements are known to all”. ‘Recent’ witnesses are well-known people who have expressed their opinions about some disputed matter: such opinions will be useful support for subsequent disputants on the same points...” (Aristotle, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 15, 1375b, 27-29; 1376a, 7-9). Aristotle also, mentions proverbs as witnesses and soothsayers as witnesses of future events. “Most trustworthy of all are the ‘ancient’ witnesses, since they cannot be corrupted” is Aristotle’s conclusion (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 15, 1376a, 17-18).

The fact that rhetoric affects the giving of decisions is no less important in forensic speaking than in political oratory because the legal verdict is a decision. Like in political oratory, in lawsuits, too, it adds to the speaker’s influence “that his own character should look right and he should be thought to entertain the right feelings towards his hearers” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. II, Ch. 1, 26-27). That the audience should be in the right frame of mind is particularly important in lawsuits. Friendly and placable people think different things than angry and hostile people do, or they think the same things with different intensity: when they feel friendly to the man who comes before them for judgement, they regard him as having done little wrong, if any; when they feel hostile, they take the opposite view.

Aristotle finds three things which inspire confidence in the orator’s own character - good sense, good moral character and goodwill. “False statements and bad advice are due to one or more of the following three causes. Men either form a false opinion through want of good sense; or they form a true opinion, but because of their moral badness do not say what they really think; or finally, they are both sensible and upright, but not well disposed to their hearers, and may fail in consequence to recommend what they know to be the best course. These are the only possible cases” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. II, Ch. 1, 1378a, 9-14). It is possible to say that morally bad and distrustful men produce either a false opinion or fail to do even what they know to be good. Men who have the above mentioned three good qualities are sure to inspire trust in their audience. The way to make themselves thought to be sensible and morally good is the same as shown in the analysis of goodness (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 7, 9). The ways in which one can make people trust the goodness of other people are also the ways in which one can make them trust one’s own.

To show his good sense the forensic speaker must show that he has the qualification and is able to explain the matters of a lawsuit. It is said in the analysis of the goodness of judgement that “that which would be judged, or which has been judged, a good thing, or a better thing than something else, by all or most people of understanding, or by the majority of men, or by the ablest, must be so... This is indeed a general principle, applicable to all other judgements also; not only the goodness of things, but their essence, magnitude and general nature are in fact just what knowledge and understanding will declare them to be” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk.I, Ch. 7, 12-17). The forensic speaker must present himself as the ablest of those who can propose a decision which would be the best decision.

To show his good moral character the forensic speaker must confirm some way that the reward to him is simply honour because honour is more than money. Such actions the reward for which is honour are noble, and noble is “that which is good and also pleasant because good” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 9, 33-34; 1366b, 35-36). Since the forensic speaker does what he does for the sake of others, his action may be shown as noble and a good deed since it is not directed to his own profit. In this his good will may be apparent, even though his proposed judgement may be presented as an action that is “not good simply for the individual, since individual interests are selfish” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 9, 1366b, 39-40). Moreover, as Aristotle assumes in the analysis of anger, “the man with a turn for oratory looks for respect from one who cannot speak” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. II, Ch. 2, 1379a, 38-39). Thus the forensic speaker should present himself with some dignity to win the general respect from his hearers. So much for the forensic speaker’s character which must look right.

That the audience should be in the right frame of mind is particularly important in lawsuits. To have the audience in the right frame of mind means to have it friendly and trustful. To avoid slighting on the part of the audience the case should be presented with all gravity to seem important, because this emotion is entertained at something which is obviously of no importance. To avoid contempt, spite and insolence from the audience, both the speaker and the case should be presented with some sense of superiority and dignity, because it is those who feel superior over something that exercise these emotions. To overcome anger in the hearts of the hearers, the forensic speaker must appear trustworthy in his speech so that the audience could calm down, because anger is exercised by the minds in which any pain is felt. If the audience feels satisfied with the forensic speaker’s speech and finds the choice of the speaker successful, it is sure to become calm.

The calm hearers are more likely to turn out friendly than entertain enmity, for a friendly feeling is defined as “the feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, as far as you can, to bring these things about” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. II, Ch. 4, 1380b, 36-1381a, 2). In legal cases the audience will divide into the part supporting the accused and the part supporting the victim. The accusation and defence should mind this division and try to win over to their sides as much confidence as possible from the respective part of the audience. Furthermore, the speaker who wants his hearers to be calm, trustful and friendly, must himself be calm and well disposed rather than nervous or aggressive.

The forensic speaker may also try to stir kindness and pity in the hearers by his own noble attitude and speech. All other emotions which have to be either overcome or inspired in the hearers should be similarly approached. But the important thing is that the forensic speaker himself should be above the petty emotions, various weaknesses and selfishness, aiming at appearance. He who can propose goodness on his part and aims at reality is better than the one who aims at appearance (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 7, 1365a, 39- 1365b, 1). Though Aristotle mentions the belief “that justice is of small value, since it is more desirable to seem just than to be just” (Ibid., Bk.I, Ch. 7, 1365b, 7-8), the forensic speaker should be both, to seem just and to be just.

Aristotle has no doubts about the influence of rhetoric. He plainly states that the use of persuasive speech is to lead to decisions. But in this process every single person matters, because every person is the speaker’s judge if he has to persuade him. This treatment of the hearers holds true to all kinds of speeches - ceremonial, political and forensic. Strictly speaking, a judge is only the man who decides some issue in some matter of public controversy, i.e. in law suits and in political debates. If the speaker is to be successful, however, he takes into consideration his audience totally and his hearers as individuals. It has been already mentioned that Aristotle argues that rhetorical persuasion is effected not only by demonstrative but also by ethical argument. It supports the speaker if he can impress the audience with his own goodness or goodwill towards it. Similarly, the speaker should know the moral qualities of governments and of defendants in political and forensic speaking if he intends to argue persuasively and to achieve the desired issues. With this Aristotle concludes the question of investing speeches with moral character and turns to a discussion of arguments common to all oratory.

Aristotle’s awareness of the significance of the relation between the speaker and the listener is nothing short of a respective modern concept. The present-day concept of uses of language as related to identifiable goals of speech seems to be a common sense conception. This has been noted by some authors (cf.: Mounin, 1967 and others).

Besides their special lines of argument, all orators, whether political, ceremonial or forensic, are bound to use, for instance, the topic of possible and impossible, the topic of size and others. Having analysed these subjects, Aristotle intends to say what he can about the general principles of arguing by ‘enthymeme’ and ‘example’. He yet reminds that the above mentioned general lines of argument divide as to particular kind of oratory: that concerned with amplification is most appropriate to ceremonial speeches which deal with the present, that concerned with the past to forensic speeches and that concerned with possibility and the future to political speeches.

Aristotle’s consideration of the possible and the impossible is based on examples. He chooses things in consecutive or contrary relations, in relations of degree of parts and argues that where a whole is possible a part is possible, or where a better quality is possible, the worse is possible. Taking the contraries of the arguments stated above, the conditions of the impossible can be clearly presented.

Questions of the past fact are argued possible on the basis of consecutive and temporal relations. Thus, for example: that if the less likely of two things has occurred, the more likely must have occurred also. If one thing that usually follows another has happened, then that other thing has happened too. That if a man had the power and the wish to do a thing, he has done it; for every one does do whatever he intends to do whenever he can do it, there being nothing to stop him. Further Aristotle elaborates on different positions of these examples (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. II, Ch.19, 1392b, 15-25). Of all of these sequences considered some are inevitable and some are merely usual. The arguments for the non-occurrence of anything can obviously be found by considering the opposites of those that have been mentioned.

Questions of the future fact are argued similarly. There is a certainty that a thing will be done if there is both the power and the wish to do it. In addition there may be a craving for the result, or anger, or calculation prompting it along with the power that can enhance the possibility of the occurrence.

For arguments about the greatness and smallness of things, references are made to deliberative oratory, in which the relative greatness of various goods and the greater and the lesser in general had been considered. Greatness and smallness had been treated as quantitative terms as well as qualitative notions, when, owing to a greater or smaller degree of some quantity, a new quality appears. For example, a greater number of goods is a greater good than one or than a smaller number. Relative goodness and relative utility is a point in this consideration, too.

Since in each type of oratory the object under discussion is some kind of good - whether it is utility, nobleness or justice - every orator must obtain the materials of amplification through the respective channels. To go further than this, and to try to establish abstract laws of greatness and superiority, would be to argue without an object. In practical life, particular facts count more than generalisations (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. II, Ch. 19, 1393a, 12-18).

Of the forms of oratorical argument common to all kinds of oratory are the Example and the Enthymeme as well as the Maxim which is part of the enthymeme. The form of argument by example has two varieties - one includes the mentioning of actual past facts and the other includes the invention of facts by the speaker. The latter, again, has two varieties - the illustrative parallel and the fable. The illustrative parallel means the employment of an analogous fact with more obvious results. The fable means the employment of a tale with a didactic end, which teaches a lesson in a ludicrous or otherwise demonstrative way.

The Maxim is a statement about a general fact and questions of practical conduct, course of conduct to be chosen or avoided. Since an enthymeme is a syllogism, (in which one premise is not explicitly stated), dealing with such practical subjects, it is roughly true that the premises and conclusions of enthymemes, considered apart from the rest of the argument, are Maxims. ‘There is no man among us all is free’ is a maxim, but with the following line from Euripides’s play, ‘For all are slaves of money and chance’ added, it becomes an enthymeme. Depending on whether the statement is paradoxical and disputable or not, a supplement may and may not be added to a maxim and thus it may be of four kinds: the maxim may or may not have a supplement. Proof is needed where the statement is paradoxical or disputable, and no supplement is required where the statement contains nothing paradoxical. Of the Maxims that do have a supplement attached, some are part of an enthymeme. Others have the essential character of enthymemes, but are not stated as parts of enthymemes. The maxim which has the essential character of the enthymeme but is not stated as the enthymeme is considered to be the best. For example, ‘O mortal man, nurse not immortal wrath’. The apostrophe ‘O mortal man’ gives reason to the otherwise simple maxim which does not have the form of the enthymeme and gives life to it. It could otherwise read as ‘It is not right to nurse immortal wrath’, but would lose a significant implication and emphasis on man.

The use of maxims is appropriate only to elderly men, and in handling subjects in which the speaker is experienced. For a young man to use them is, like telling stories, unbecoming, because it appears silly and ill-bred. It is right to use even well known maxims because the listeners experience a sense of sharing on hearing them. Moreover, maxims invest a speech with moral character because the utterance amounts to a general declaration of moral principles. Since there is moral character in every speech in which the moral purpose is conspicuous, maxims are very relevant in speeches (Zabulis, 1995, VII).

In using the enthymeme which is a kind of syllogism, it is not advisable to carry its reasoning too far back, or the length of argument will cause obscurity. It is not advisable, either, to put in all the steps that lead to conclusion because time will be wasted in saying what is manifest. The conditions of speech making and the character of the enthymeme require this. This simplicity with enthymemes sometimes makes the uneducated more successful with popular audiences.

Aristotle further explains the simplicity required in handling enthymemes. The first requirement to the speaker is that he should know some, if not all, the facts about the subject on which he is going to speak and argue. This concerns part history and present affairs in political questions and eulogies, as well as in invectives and in legal cases. Not all facts can form the basis of an argument, but only those that bear on the matter in hand. No proof can be affected otherwise by means of the speech. First of all a selection of arguments that may arise and are suitable for the speaker to handle a question must be made. Then arguments of the same type for special needs as they emerge must be thought out. This should be done not vaguely, but by keeping the eyes on the actual facts of the subject that is discussed or argued. Thus the first principle of the selection of enthymemes refers to the lines of the argument selected.

There are two kinds of enthymemes: one kind proves some affirmative or negative proposition; the other kind disproves one. The difference between the two kinds is the same as that between syllogistic proof and disproof in dialectic. The demonstrative enthymeme is formed by the conjunction of compatible propositions; the refutative by the conjunction of incompatible propositions. The refutative enthymeme has a greater reputation than the demonstrative, because within a small space it works out two opposing arguments, and arguments put side by side are clearer to the audience. Syllogisms function in a similar way. Of all syllogisms, whether refutative or demonstrative, those are the best of which one foresees the conclusions from the beginning, if they are not obvious at first sight. This involves the audience. Part of the pleasure the hearers feel is that of their own intelligent participation. Part of the pleasure is also in the ease of participation. It is the case with syllogisms which the hearers follow well enough to see the point of them as soon as the last word has been uttered.

Further Aristotle turns to a classification of objections and refutations, showing how they can be brought to bear upon enthymemes. Then he considers nine topics of apparent or sham enthymemes and the refutation of enthymemes. Having exhausted the thought-element in speech making or the way to invent and refute arguments, there remain two more points to consider, which are style and arrangement. In making a speech three points must be studied: first, the means of producing persuasion, second, the style or language to be used, and, third, the proper arrangement of the various parts of the speech.

After considering how persuasion can be produced by facts, the question of how the facts should be set out in language arises. For it is not enough to know what to say. The speaker must know how to say it in the right way. This is also part of persuasion. The third question would be the question of the proper method of delivery. Although this question had not been studied systematically, Aristotle recommends that, irrespective of the subject, the speaker has to bear three things in mind - volume of sound, modulation of pitch and rhythm.

In Aristotle’s opinion, delivery is not regarded as an elevated subject of inquiry. Still, the business of rhetoric being concerned with appearances, attention must be paid to the subject of delivery, because the speaker cannot do without it. The speaker should not annoy his hearers and nothing should matter more to him than the proof of the facts. The arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance: the way in which a thing is said does affect its intelligibility.

Dramatic ability is a natural gift, and can hardly be systematically taught. Therefore there are men of ability who win prizes as well as those speakers who excel in delivery - speeches of the written or literary kind owe more of their effect to their diction than to their thought. A poetical manner of delivery should not be imitated because the poets themselves have dropped it. The whole question of style may be confined to that part of it which concerns rhetoric.

Aristotle is very direct and plain on style. To be good, style must be clear. It must also be appropriate, avoiding both meanness and undue elevation. Clarity is secured by using the words that are correct and ordinary. Such variation from what is usual makes the language appear more stately. But in general a writer must disguise his art and give the impression of speaking naturally and not artificially. Naturalness is persuasive, while artificiality is the contrary. Strange words, compound words, and invented words must be used sparingly and on few occasions, not to depart from what is suitable in the direction of excess.

The proper or regular and the metaphorical words should be used for they are used by everybody in conversation. A good writer can produce a style that is distinguished without being obtrusive, and is at the same time clear, thus satisfying the definition of good oratorical prose. Words of ambiguous meaning are useful to the sophist to mislead his hearers, while synonyms are useful to the poet. Prose writers must pay careful attention to metaphor, because their other resources are scantier than those of the poets. Moreover, metaphor gives style clearness, charm and distinction, and its use cannot be taught by one man to another. Epithets, which are a kind of metaphor, must fairly correspond to the thing signified. If a writer wishes to pay a compliment, he must choose his metaphor from something better in the same line; if to disparage, from something worse. Thus Iphicrates called Callias a ‘mendicant priest’ instead of a ‘torch-bearer’, thus offending the foolish aristocrat and was considered uninitiated for that. Both are religious titles, but the latter is honourable, while the former is not.

In using metaphors, they must be drawn not from remote but from kindred and similar things, so that the kinship is clearly perceived as soon as the words are said. Furthermore, the materials of metaphors must be beautiful. The beauty, like the ugliness, of all words may lie in their sound or in their meaning.

Aristotle has something to say about the difference in meaning conveyed by different language. It is not true, like sophists argue, that there is no such thing as foul language, because in whatever words you put a given thing your meaning is the same. In fact, one term may describe a thing more truly than another, may be more like it, and represent it more fittingly to the hearer. Moreover, two different words will represent a thing in two different lights. Thus, one term must be held fairer or fouler than another. The materials of metaphor must be beautiful to the ear, the understanding, to the eye or some other physical sense. It is better, for instance, to say ‘rosy-fingered morn’ than ‘crimson-fingered’ or ‘red-fingered’. With Orestes, too, it is better when he is called his ‘father’s avenger’ than his ‘mother’s slayer’. A similar effect is attained by the use of diminutives. In using diminutives, like in using epithets, the speaker must be wary and observe the mean.

Bad taste in language may be due to the misuse of compound words, to the employment of strange words, to the use of long, unreasonable or frequent epithets, and to the tasteless use of metaphor. To avoid it, in all cases the due mean should be observed. When the sense is plain, one can only obscure and spoil its clearness by piling up words or employing inappropriate metaphors.

According to Aristotle, the foundation of good style is correct language which has five aspects: 1)the proper use of connecting words and the arrangement of them in natural sequence which some of them require; 2)calling things by their own special names and not by vague general ones; 3)the avoidance of ambiguities, unless, indeed, the speaker definitely desires to be ambiguous, (but in this case the person may have nothing to say, just to pretend he means something); 4)the observing of Protagoras’s classification of nouns into male, female and inanimate, for these distinctions must be correctly given; 5)the observing of the expression of plurality, fewness and unity by correct wording. A general rule is that a well written composition should be easy to read and therefore easy to deliver. Faulty or difficult punctuation makes this task impossible. (Aristotle. Rhetoric, Bk. III, Ch. 5, 1407a-b)

Aristotle gives a few suggestions of how to make language impressive. (1)Describe a thing instead of naming it. (2)Represent things with the help of metaphors and epithets, being careful to avoid poetical effects. (3)Use plural for singular as in poetry. (4)Do not bracket two words under one article, but put one article with each. (5)Use plenty of connecting words, but, to secure conciseness, dispense with connectives. (6)Describe a thing by mentioning attributes it does not possess. (Aristotle. Rhetoric, Bk. III, Ch. 6, 1407b-1408a)

There is a special note on appropriateness in Rhetoric. Language will be appropriate if it expresses emotion and character, and if it corresponds to its subject. This aptness of language makes the listeners believe the truth of the story. Such language also expresses the personal character of the speaker - his age, sex, nationality. (Aristotle. Rhetoric, Bk. III, Ch. 7, 1408a, 10-35)

All the variations of oratorical style may be used appropriately and inappropriately. The best way to counteract any exaggeration is to put in some criticism of oneself. The effect of such a device is that people feel it must be all right for him to talk thus, since he certainly knows what he is doing. Further, it is better not to have everything always corresponding to everything else. The harshness of words, for instance, should not extend over to the harshness of the voice and countenance, and the speaker has to have everything else keeping. There must be a balance in everything the orator uses, rhythm and metre of his prose composition as in the tone of words and voice that he employs. Prose must be rhythmical but not metrical. The iambic is the rhythm of ordinary speech of ordinary people, and therefore sometimes useful. Aristotle particularises on rhythm, the use of iamb and periodic style. The effect of logical argument by antithesis is also mentioned. (Aristotle. Rhetoric, Bk. III, Ch. 7, 1408b – Ch. 8, 1409a)

In a lengthy consideration of the resources of metaphor, Aristotle exemplifies its several kinds and finds the proportional kind most appealing. His illustration comes from Pericles who said that “the vanishing from the country of the young men who had fallen in the war was ‘as if the spring were taken out of the year’.” (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. III, Ch. 10, 1411a, 2-4). One more kind of metaphor is found very impressive. That is the graphic metaphor, which makes the hearers see things. Finally Aristotle states that what is surprising in language is most impressive; it may not be metaphor, but must be something unexpected, such as well-constructed riddles, jokes depending upon changes of a letter in a word and similar devices. Successful similes when they are very close to metaphor, such as, for example, the ‘drinking-bowl of Ares’ for a shield, or the ‘chordless lyre’ for a bow are very impressive, as are even metaphor-like proverbs and successful hyperboles. Moreover, hyperboles are for young men to use for they show the vehemence of character.

Each kind of rhetoric has to have its own appropriate style. The style of written prose differs from that of spoken oratory. Political and forensic speaking are also different. The bigger the assembly the speaker addresses, the more distant point of view should be taken. High finish in detail may be superfluous. The forensic style is more highly finished; still more is the style of language addressed to a single judge, with whom there is very little room for rhetorical artifices, because he can take the whole thing in better, and judge what is to the point and what is not. It is ceremonial oratory that is most literary, for it is meant to be read. Next to it is forensic oratory. Whichever the case, style has to have the traits of restraint, liberality or any other moral excellence. Style will be made agreeable by the elements mentioned, viz. by a good blending of ordinary and unusual words, by the rhythm and by the persuasiveness that springs from appropriateness. (Aristotle. Rhetoric, Bk. III, Ch. 12, 1413b-1414a)

The composition or arrangement of a speech is also important. A speech has two parts - the Statement and the Argument. The case must be stated and then proven. Narration is part of a forensic speech only. Introduction, comparison of conflicting arguments and recapitulation are found only in political speeches when there is a struggle between two policies. Epilogues are not necessary in a closely reasoned speech. Refutation of the opponent is part of the arguments. So is ‘Comparison’ of the opponent’s case with one’s own, for that process is a magnifying of one’s own case and therefore a part of the arguments. The Introduction does nothing like this, nor does the Epilogue.

Introduction, however, is not quite unimportant, because introductions differ for different kinds of speeches and they can help follow the argument. The Introduction is the beginning of a speech corresponding to the prologue in poetry. In ceremonial speeches of display an introduction is reminiscent of musical preludes - the speaker should begin with what best takes his fancy and then strike up his theme and lead into it. The usual introduction to speeches of display is some piece of praise or censure. Introductions to forensic speeches have the same value as the prologues of dramas and the introductions to epic poems. The theme is intended to inform the hearers of it in advance instead of keeping their minds in suspense. Introductions in political oratory are made of the same materials as those of the forensic kind, though the nature of political oratory makes them very rare. (Aristotle. Rhetoric, Bk. III, Ch. 14, 1414b-1415a-b)

Aristotle gives some attention to narration. Although it has been said that narration belongs mainly to forensic oratory, narration in ceremonial oratory is mentioned here too. Narration in ceremonial oratory is not continuous but intermittent. The narrative may not be continuous, because it is hard to keep all details in mind. Facts in narration must lead to conclusions that the hero is brave, for example, that he is able or just. A speech thus arranged is comparatively simple rather than complicated and elaborate. Narrations should not be long or told rapidly. Their rightness consists in the happy mean, that is in saying just so much that will make the facts plain, or will lead the hearer to believe that the thing has happened and that the facts are as important as the speaker wishes them to be thought of. The narration may be presented so as to do credit to the speaker or discredit his adversary. Such facts that the judges would enjoy should be added.

The narration should depict character. The indication of moral purpose is one thing that it does. The words should not be shown inspired so much by intelligence as by moral purpose. Where any detail may appear incredible, its cause should be added. If the speaker has no such cause as Antigone’s to suggest, he can just say that he is aware that no one may believe his words, but the fact remains that such is his nature. However hard the world may find it to believe that a man deliberately does anything except what pays him, his case is different. (Aristotle. Rhetoric, Bk. III, Ch. 16, 1416b-1417a)

The speaker must make use of the emotions. He may relate familiar manifestations of them and then those that distinguish himself and his opponent. He must select telling words to describe the expression of the emotions. The speaker must introduce himself at the beginning in the right light. The same should be done with the adversary. The adversary, however, should better be introduced by implication in different parts of the speech, sometimes not at all at the beginning. (Aristotle. Rhetoric, Bk. III, Ch. 16, 1417a, 36-38 – 1417b, 1-12)

In political oratory there is little opening for narration. If there is narration at all, it should be of past events, the recollection of which is to help the hearers to make better plans for the future. It may also be employed to attack some one’s character or to eulogise him. But this is not the right role of the political speaker. If any statement he makes is hard to believe, he must guarantee its truth and offer an explanation and then add such particulars as will be expected.

Arguments is another point in Aristotle’s consideration. The role of the arguments is to attempt demonstrative proofs. The proofs must bear directly upon the question in dispute, which must fall under one of four kinds. (1)If the assumption is that the act was not committed, the task in court is to prove this. (2)If the assumption is that the act did no harm, it must be proven. (3)If the assumption is that the act was less than is alleged or (4)justified, the facts must be proven. (Aristotle. Rhetoric, Bk. III, Ch. 17, 1417b, 15-34)

In ceremonial speeches the case will be mainly developed by arguing that what has been done is, for example, noble and useful. The facts themselves are required to be taken on trust; proof of them is only submitted on those rare occasions when they are not easily credible or when they have been set down to some one else.

In political speeches one may argue that a proposal is impracticable, or that, though practicable, it is unjust, or will do no good, or is not so important as its proposer thinks. Any falsehoods about irrelevant matters will look like proof in this kind of oratory that the speaker’s other statements are also false. Argument by ‘example’ is very suitable for political oratory, while argument by ‘enthymeme’ better suits forensic oratory. Political oratory deals with future events, of which it can do no more than quote past events as examples. Forensic oratory deals with what is or is not now true, which can better be demonstrated, because not contingent. A continuous succession of enthymemes is not advisable because they will spoil the effect without variation of the matter. Enthymemes on every point are not advisable either. The enthymeme form should also be avoided when trying to rouse feeling: it may either kill the feeling or itself fall flat. The enthymeme form in depicting character is also irrelevant because the process of demonstration can express neither moral character nor moral purpose. Maxims should be employed in the arguments and in the narration, since they do express character. For example, specifically appealing to the emotions: ‘I do not regret it, though I have been wronged; if he has the profit on his side, I have justice on mine’.

Aristotle is convinced that political oratory is a more difficult task than forensic since it deals with the future. Besides, forensic oratory has a basis in the law, and, once the speaker has a starting-point, he can prove anything with comparative ease. Then again, political oratory affords few chances for the leisurely digressions in which one may attack one’s adversary or talk about oneself, or work on one’s hearer’s emotions. But, finding oneself in difficulties, a political speaker may follow the lead of Athenian speakers, and that of Isocrates, who made regular attacks upon people in the course of a political speech. (Aristotle. Rhetoric, Bk. III, Ch. 17, 1418a, 20-25)

It is advisable in ceremonial oratory, to intersperse one’s speech with bits of episodic eulogy, like Isocrates, who used to bring some one forward for this purpose. And it was this what Gorgias meant by saying that he always found something to talk about, even if his last resort was the Gods. When he spoke of Achilles, he praised Peleus, then Aeacus and finally Zeus. In the like manner he praised the great virtue Courage and its value. (Aristotle. Rhetoric, Bk. III, Ch. 17, 1418a, 30-37)

Both in political speaking and in court, if one is the first speaker, one should put one’s own arguments forward first and then meet the arguments of the other side. Refutation follows the statement of one’s own arguments. If, however, the case of the other side contains a great variety of arguments, these must be taken up first and refuted. If one speaks later, it is advisable to answer one’s opponent’s speech by refutation or counter-syllogism, especially if his arguments have been well received.

The element of moral character which is important cannot always be asserted in the first person. Similarly, some things cannot be said directly about the opponent without seeming abusive or ill-bred. Such elements should be put into the mouth of the third person the way great orators such as Isocrates or dramatists like Sophocles did. For clarity’s sake, sometimes it is useful, too, to restate one’s enthymemes in the form of maxims.

The point of interrogation in forensic matters requires subtlety and wit on the part of the speaker. First, a favourable moment should be found and used to put important questions to the opponent. Second, logic and wit should aid the speaker with obvious conclusions and generalisations. Third, in situations which exclude series of questions enthymemes should be used, but they must be as compact as possible.

In replying, the speaker should draw reasonable distinctions rather than give curt answers to ambiguous questions. In meeting questions which seem to involve one in contradiction, the explanation should be offered at the outset of one’s answer, before the opponent asks the next question or draws his conclusion. The conclusions of the opponent in the form of a question should be justified. (Aristotle. Rhetoric, Bk. III, Ch. 18, 1419a, 1-35)

Aristotle finds humour relevant in rhetoric. Jests are supposed to be of some service in controversy. The famous speaker Gorgias said that one should kill one’s opponents’ earnestness with jesting and their jesting with earnestness. Only some jests are becoming a gentleman, while others are not. Irony better befits a gentleman than buffoonery: the ironical man jokes to amuse himself, while the buffoon to amuse other people. With this note on humour, Aristotle finishes his consideration of the language of the speech. (Aristotle. Rhetoric, Bk. III, Ch. 18, 1419b, 1-9)

In conclusion, Aristotle mentions the final parts of a speech and its features. The Epilogue has four parts in every speech in which it is found befitting. In the epilogue one should 1)make the audience well disposed towards oneself and ill-disposed towards the opponent, 2)magnify or minimise the leading facts, 3)excite the required emotion in the hearers, and 4)refresh their memories. For the conclusion, the disconnected style of language is appropriate.

It has been evident in this review of Aristotle’s work that content and the technique of rhetoric were bound up in the antiquity. This is most obvious in forensic oratory in which various aspects of the content and its presentation are encompassed. Aristotle defines the concept of wrong-doing in general and the wrong-doer in particular and considers different aspects of these concepts. With a philosophical bent of mind, he further considers the nature and number of the incentives to wrong-doing and the state of the mind of wrong-doers. Finally, the persons who are wronged and their condition are outlined. In this general consideration, Aristotle tackles such notions as virtue, the noble and the base, the soul, happiness, pleasure, well-being, different emotions and their states. It is the definition of these concepts that requires philosophical treatment. A revision of temperate and intemperate states of mind, healthy and unhealthy appetites and craving for something possessed by others permits Aristotle to review the content of legal cases in general and, consequently, the content of forensic oratory. The presentation of the content again involves a consideration of such philosophical concepts as the possible and the impossible, greatness and smallness, the future and the past fact and others. Like the previous, these concepts are reviewed in a concise and exhaustive manner.

Argument in legal cases is presented through a consideration of the categories of reasoning, such as the enthymeme, the syllogism and the example. Although the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism, it is a more laconic syllogism in rhetoric than in dialectic because one premise in it is not explicit. It cannot be made either too complicated or too extensive because it is not likely to be followed by the audience if carried to too great lengths. Aristotle gives a piece of direct advice not to carry the reasoning in the enthymeme too far back not to obscure the argument by its length. Not all the steps of the syllogistic reasoning are required in conclusions, either, not to extend them beyond reasonable limits in saying what is manifest. What is required from the speaker is a good grasp of the facts, their motivated classification and the simplicity of reasoning.

Aristotle considers two sides of the argument - the statement and refutation. He gives even advice in what order the opponent’s statements should be refuted so that one’s own statements could be given with full clarity. But in Rhetoric, Aristotle does not consider the development of the legal case which is the matter that was also developed in the classical rhetoric. The classical rhetoric encompassed a description and definition of different positions or statuses (ςtaςiς) of legal cases (Zabulis, 1995, IIIff). The identification of the states of the legal case belongs to Hermagorus and was introduced into rhetoric by Cicero.

Both the matter and the technique are integrated in Aristotle’s rhetoric. For example, one of the most important resources for Aristotle is definition. Beginning every point of a new argument Aristotle begins with a definition. This ensures understanding and grounds reasoning. With less integrity of content and technique, later authors on rhetoric had to introduce the definition as a method or a means and had to specify separately its essence. As the subject matter and the technique are integrated in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, his reasoning is clear, while the advice given is very concrete and convincing.

Aristotle is fairly brief on language matters but very concrete. Although the whole third Book of Rhetoric is dedicated to style, Aristotle remains within the confines of his own concept that style must be clear and appropriate. When he gives advice on the use of a concrete device, for example, of a maxim, metaphor, simile or epithet in the final section of his treatise or at its other points, he always defines the essence of the device and illustrates its use. Thus verbal matters are well integrated in the content, too. Especially clear and useful is his consideration of the maxim and the enthymeme, which is interesting from the point of view of the content and the technique. Comments on how devices suit the age of the speaker (maxims are for the old and hyperboles are for the young) are practical and have remained useful to this day.

The composition of a speech is the least discussed question by Aristotle. He considers only the introduction or prologue and its necessity, the argument and the conclusion. The complete composition of a speech, which developed in the classical rhetoric, contained even five to six parts (proemium, proratio, probatio, refutatio, peroratio). Introduction alone had five variants (genus bonestum, genus humile, genus dubium, genus obscurum, genus admirabile). Like Aristotle, Cicero, too, considered the function and use of humour in speeches and the magnanimity of the speaker, for all pettiness tends to lead to a loss in oratory (Zabulis, 1995, IVff).

It is difficult to overestimate the influence of the classical rhetoric and its heritage. It has been fundamental in modern rhetoric in Great Britain and the United States. Political and forensic speaking today is unthinkable without the classical heritage in these English speaking countries. Even textbooks follow the model of the classical rhetoric. If we take, for instance, Modern Rhetoric by such influential authors Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren (Brooks, Warren, 1961), we see how close they are to the classics (cf.: Corbett, Connors, 1999).

Apart fom identifying the classical kinds of rhetoric, Brooks and Warren focus on the four main forms of discourse (exposition, argument, description and narration) and thus cover the subject matter of rhetoric. When the extralinguistic subjects (politics, legal cases. or subjects of praise and blame) are not integrated in rhetoric, the analysis of the forms of discourse is the only way of approach to remain close to the subject matter while discussing questions of technique and usage. They present rhetoric ready for application in any sphere.

Forms of discourse not only cover the principal modes of the presentation of the material but also incorporate such questions as definition, classification, illustration and a few means of exposure, such as comparison and contrast, analysis and others. The simple modes of presentation, such as description and narration, are limited to their patterns and text organisation. But the more complex kinds of discourse, such as exposition and argument, allow a consideration of all the technique of rhetoric. The span of exposition has already been mentioned, and argument is limited to purely rhetorical devices, such as evidence, reasoning, and persuasion. Reasoning alone covers all matters of logic called the thought-element by Aristotle. In a more stringent and systemic way, reasoning includes a discussion of a proposition, the right syllogistic reasoning and its fallacies, induction and deduction and other techniques of logic.

Since the subject matter proper of different kinds of rhetoric is absent, Brooks and Warren set applied tasks to the student to make him practise different techniques and processes. But the important point is that these authors follow the general pattern of the classical rhetoric in their book, thus confirming the role and the influence of the classics and the correctness of the original approach.

Questions of language and usage are dealt with more extensively by Brooks and Warren than by Aristotle. This may again be partly explained by the essentially linguistic character of rhetoric today. Besides, a student who takes up a general course in rhetoric with the idea to apply the knowledge as the task arises, has to be instructed in detail in questions of effective usage. When no concrete content activates usage unlike it was in the antiquity, words have to be mastered to be employed accurately and successfully as the occasion arises.

Much of what was integrated in the classics is treated as separate questions of discussion and study today. But the classical heritage is itself integrated in modern rhetoric (cf.: Corbett, Connors, 1999, which is based on Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student by the same authors) and all the techniques remain true within the pattern of syllogistic reasoning. Other concrete elements of rhetoric which existed as minor integrated elements in the antiquity may change their function but the general concept of the kinds of rhetoric and its application are unthinkable without the classics today. Aristotle’s philosophical concepts and definitions apply not only to language but also to man whose nature has not changed through centuries. That is why the rhetoric of the classical antiquity cannot be dispensed with. It can only be applied better or worse. That is why this lengthy review of Rhetoric by Aristotle has been indispensable, while care to detail in it has to show that the classics have left complete and integrated conceptions of the subject, which cannot be reviewed casually. We, modern authors, have to respect the classical works at least when we cannot produce anything comparable today.

A Note on the Linguistic Evidence of Rhetoric

The language of rhetoric would not be rich in new evidence of the potential meaning of language if analysed. First, to have immediate comprehension and appeal, the language of rhetoric has to be simple. Indeed, the use of English in rhetoric follows the laws of literary English in which analytic clarity is the key feature. But the analytic clarity of English has been sufficiently described here. Second, the emotive element which is present in the language of rhetoric is also subjected to the law of analytic clarity. In general, commonly current vocabulary and syntactical patterns ensure it. Tropes (metaphor, metonymy, hyperbole, and similes) and figures of speech (antithesis, climactic enumerations, parallelisms, chiasmus, apostrophe, etc) are employed in rhetoric, but these devices are rarely original, again for the sake of clarity. They are rather quotations or typical patterns of the known devices, therefore their analysis should better be left to the language of literature and to the sources specially dedicated for this purpose (cf.: Leech, 1969; Galperin, 1977; Geniušas, 1982; Corbett, Connors, 1999, and others). The moderately transferred sense in the language of rhetoric explains why I have called it a quasi-referential use of language.

It has also been known since the classical antiquity that rhetoric may and does employ maxims/sententiae, quotations, clichés and allusions) again for the service to the audience. Maxims and sententiae, for example, contain a philosophical element or viewpoint. “By virtue of their familiarity to the audience, the use of these units entails the listener’s sharing in the speaker’s reasoning, and rhetoric gains in effect” (Zabulis, 1995, VII). As the latter are fixed units of meaning, their usage defies linguistic analysis, with a discovery of contextual resourcefulness. Their use can show only how the speaker exploits their meaning and how appropriately he employs them. These units, however, can testify how the potential meaning of language works, that is to say how it simplifies or hinders understanding.

There exists some evidence on this account from the published analyses of J.F.Kennedy’s Inaugural Address (Carter, 1969). On having analysed the use of allusions while employing slightly paraphrased or precise quotations “by riding the back of the tiger”, to “undo the heavy burden … and to let the oppressed go free”, and “rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation”, all of which had been from the Bible, this author concluded that the perception of the particular allusions as of the speech itself depended on “literary sophistication of the audience”. The comments that are supplied in the book The Presidents Speak, which confirm how the speaker’s words were applauded and how the cries of the audience “mingled with cheers and applause” (The Presidents Speak, 315), confirm that the audience stayed involved and that its sophistication was satisfactory. It also confirms that John F.Kennedy’s Inaugural Address was a perfect specimen of the art of rhetoric.

These observations permit one to see why literary sophistication is required in the perception of rhetoric adorned with quotations and allusions. Maxims and sententiae are fixed units which are current unchanged, as a rule, and most of the listeners are familiar with their meaning, which may be more or less general, more or less idiomatic. Allusions, which are references by a word or a phrase to a personality, an event or to a story, and which was “the first one hundred days” in John F.Kennedy’s Inaugural Address that alluded to Franklin D.Roosevelt’s first term, are more difficult to understand. The audience of January 20, 1961, was well familiar with this allusion as it “drew on enthusiastic response from the crowd of listeners” (The President’s Speak, 314). Quotations are not simple units in terms of understanding, either. In order to understand and appreciate a quotation fully, the listener must first identify it, relate it to its original context, rehearse its meaning mentally and reappreciate it in a concrete new instance of rhetoric. The listeners who cannot perform these mental acts of reference remain blind to the meaning of a quotation and may take the words only at their face value. Professor Henry G. Widdowson had foreseen such possibilities for young readers of poetry and wrote in his Practical Stylistics (Widdowson, 1992) that young readers should be allowed to read poetry based on quotations and allusions simply, out of the zero potential of their own resources, and to give, unhindered, an individual interpretation of a concrete poem. The task with rhetoric is different, however. The listeners have to react on the spur of the moment and this is to increase or decrease their trust in the speaker and in the conclusions the listeners are expected to make. That is why literary sophistication of the audience is essential in the perception of rhetoric. But this brief road to the content and context of quotations and allusions also confirms how multi-layered meaning is in language, how it accumulates through literary contexts historically and how then, consequently, it challenges the listener in its perception and in his reaction to it.

Anyone who is aware of the wealth of the literary heritage of English, even if one takes only the current and possible quotations from Shakespeare and the Bible, can realise what challenge this language can be to a listener and, especially, to a foreign speaker who finds himself in communication with academics, literary historians, public speakers, politicians and diplomats. It is no wonder then that the anecdotal story of an interpreter who had almost caused an international row while he attempted to translate a quotation from Hamlet, “All is not well in the kingdom of Denmark”, literally, can be true. But, most importantly, this shows how powerful language as a body is and how tricky meaning can be in a language with a rich literary heritage. This challenge is most obvious in the perception of rhetoric and less so in routine communication unless one faces tactless and self-opinionated speakers who attempt to confuse a foreigner, for example, for fun. But the potential power of the English language remains. It can empower an educated speaker and it can turn into a dangerous trap to its irresponsible learners.

Thinking of the lesson that the potential meaning of language drawn from its literary heritage can teach a learner, it is the task that he faces that must be realised. This task can be tackled only through reading. Learning single quotations cannot help. But a reward is the pleasure that the listener feels when he recognises quotations in their original context and when he deduces their meaning in the immediate context. This pleasure is gratifying but it is available only to the well-read learners of the language. One wonders then what gain is begotten in universities which reduce courses of literature and classroom hours of study for students majoring in English and other modern languages.

The Influence of Rhetoric on Thought and Action

Before launching on a long discussion of the nature and features of rhetoric treated as an art of the greatest speakers in his dialogue Phaedrus, Plato has Socrates asking how great the power of the influence of rhetoric is. The immediate answer which Phaedrus gives is that it is very powerful, especially in crowd’s gathering (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 268a). Although this question is not discussed further, it is not denied by Plato, either. One can take for granted that, with persuasion as its main aim, rhetoric can influence, especially popular thought, to drive it even to action. Aristotle, too, mentioned private counsellors and men who address public assemblies who always take one of the two courses proposed by a political speech, which always urges people to do or not to do something (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch.3, 1358b, 7-10).

The influence of rhetoric on thought and action becomes clearer when one considers the usefulness of rhetoric. Alongside with the argument on persuasion, Aristotle himself makes the point of the usefulness of rhetoric. First, about forensic oratory. In legal cases the judge has to hear whether the alleged fact has or has not happened and decide whether it was important or unimportant, just or unjust. He must refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points which the law-giver has not foreseen and defined for him. The laws, however well drawn, do not cover all the cases of individual people when they become wrong-doers. These conditions cause some difficulties. First, legal cases have to be decided by a few people - the judge and members of the jury in a very short time. The laws passed by the law-givers are made after long consideration, but are prospective and general and are not always helpful because decisions in the courts are to be given at short notice. It is hard for those who try the case to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency. Second, the judge and the jury may have allowed themselves to be influenced emotionally and lose clear vision of the truth. They may have their judgement obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain. Thus the orator in forensic cases may help the judge to regain the clarity of vision and to be allowed to decide as few things as possible.

In political oratory, too, advice is expected from the orator. Although the same systematic principles apply to political as to forensic oratory and although political oratory is a nobler business and fitter for a citizen than forensic oratory which deals with relations of private individuals, orators in both cases require knowledge of how to handle questions facing them. In both cases the hearers expect unambiguous proof and advice. Aristotle’s contemporaries in most cases overlooked the essentials of persuasion in both these kinds of oratory (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 1, 1354b, 20-23). Aristotle considered his own clarity on persuasion through the example and the enthymeme one of the merits of his own treatise.

Political oratory deals with wider issues than forensic oratory, and for a man who is forming a judgement in a political debate is making a decision about his own vital interests. Thus his decision is likely to be all the more proper. In political speaking there is no need to prove anything except that the facts are what the supporter of a measure maintains they are. In forensic oratory this is not enough because the listeners here have to be conciliated. It is very easy in this case to include unnecessary questions or emphatic stress on emotions, but irrelevant speaking was forbidden in the law courts of Aristotle’s time.

In political as well as in forensic oratory persuasion plays the most important role. Persuasion is a sort of demonstration, since man is most fully persuaded when he considers a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator’s demonstration is the enthymeme or, in some cases, the example.

Rhetoric is useful for several reasons. First, because what is true and what is just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites; if the decisions of the judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed thereof. Second, some audiences are hard to persuade even with the possession of the most exact knowledge. The argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Therefore the speaker’s aid in this case is obvious and therefore all modes of persuasion and argument, as well as notions possessed by everybody should be used by him, especially when dealing with a popular audience. Third, the orator must be able to employ persuasion in the form of strict reasoning on opposite sides of a question. This is not for the employment of it in both ways. This is important in confuting another man if he argues unfairly. Only dialectic and rhetoric can and do manage such reasoning. Fourth, the orator is necessary because he must stand for a man who cannot defend himself with his own speech and reason. He who stands for such a man and uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm to him. That would be a charge against all good things except virtue and above all against the things that are most useful, such as strength, health, wealth and generalship (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 1, 1355a, 20-35; 1355b, 1-5).

The summary above implies that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic. It is doubtlessly useful. Its function is not simply persuasion, but the discovery of the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow. In rhetoric, therefore, the term ‘rhetorician’ may describe either the speaker’s knowledge or his moral purpose, because ‘rhetorician’ in Greek can mean either a trained speaker or a tricky speaker.

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word, i.e. of those which have to be invented, are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker, the second depends on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind, and the third depends on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk.I, Ch. 2, 1356a, 1-5). Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is spoken so as to make the audience think him credible. Good men are believed more readily than others. This aspect of persuasion should be achieved by what the speaker says and not by what the people think of his character before he begins to speak. Goodness of character which is revealed in speech is the most effective means of persuasion the speaker possesses. Quintillianus even maintained that the speaker must be a very honest man, because rhetoric is such an art with the help of which anything may be proven.

Second, persuasion may be achieved through the audience, when the speech stirs the people’s emotions. The judgement of the audience when it is friendly is different from the judgement of the hostile audience. This is an important aspect in persuasion and much effort may and has been put into this on the part of the speakers as well as on the part of the writers on rhetoric

Third, persuasion may and often is effectuated through the speech itself when the truth or apparent truth is proven by means of persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 2, 1356a, 5-20). Consequently, there are three means of making persuasion effective. The man who wants to achieve it must be able to reason logically, to understand human character and goodness in various forms, and to understand the emotions, i.e. to be able to name them, to describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 2, 1356a, 20-25). But rhetoric is not the scientific study of any one separate subject; it is a faculty for providing arguments.

Since rhetoric is a faculty for providing arguments, it always leaves place for the hearer’s reasoning and decision. Moreover, the hearer has to decide in almost all the cases: in case of ceremonial oratory the decision is whether to believe or not to believe the speaker’s praising or blaming words. Further, in political oratory by choice and in forensic oratory by necessity, the hearer decides what to do or not to do, what decision to pass or to withhold.

Action is predetermined by the logic of rhetoric: in political oratory the hearer is urged to decide what to do or not to do, and in forensic oratory he has to pass his decision because that is his ultimate aim and duty. It is only in ceremonial oratory that the decision of the hearer does not lead to an immediate action: he first decides whether to believe or not to believe the praise or blame that he hears. It is only further and in consequence that he may need to support or not to support the praised and the blamed in politics or in some other sphere of activity. But, according to Aristotle, even in the ceremonial oratory of display, praise is in one respect akin to urging a course of action. The orator who knows what action or character are required shapes his statements so as to lessen the doubts of the audience and encourage it to a certain move to do something.

What has been said illustrates how well the classics were aware of the power of rhetoric and of its influence on thought and action. They did not only analyse the tasks and resources of the speaker but also indicated what issues rhetoric may have. In the modern two major English speaking countries in which rhetoric has developed with resort to the classics, the issues of rhetoric may be discovered in concrete cases of, for example, political oratory. To illustrate the influence of rhetoric in modern times, I intend to consider J.F.Kennedy’s Inaugural Address and the rhetoric of a couple of Presidential campaigns in the USA. In the latter case today rhetoric is heavily loaded with television advertising which itself makes use of quotations or periphrases of the nominees speeches.

President J.F.Kennedy’s Inaugural Address has been praised by numerous authors as one of the shortest and most intelligent speeches made by the Presidents of the USA. Except for the proverbial American topic of the freedom of man, the Inaugural Address of J.F.Kennedy deals with the classical topic of war and peace in conditions of modern times on the world scale. The years that have passed since 1961 open up a perspective for the treatment of The Inaugural Address by J.F.Kennedy as if it were a work of art. But, in its day, it was a specimen of oratory reflecting historical reality. Moreover, it was a classical specimen of political oratory deliberating the question of war and peace and based on the classical means of argument. The enthymeme as a rhetorical syllogism and the example, pointed out yet by Aristotle as the principal means of argument in rhetoric, have been retained in this Inaugural Address.

Skipping address as the formal opening of a speech, one has the text of the Inaugural Address beginning with a historical allusion. The two opening paragraphs slightly obscure the reasoning by the enthymeme because they are introductory and because rhetorical devices such as antithesis, parallelism and repetition conceal the straightforwardness of the syllogism. Nevertheless the statements even in these paragraphs can be reduced to the ultimate unambiguous propositions which are based on the syllogism. In the first paragraph, the speaker contends that the electoral victory means a celebration of freedom which, in its turn, is a renewal and a change, because this is supposedly enshrined in and foreseen by the historical oaths of the founders of the United States. But direct reference is yet avoided in the rhetorical statement of the cause to enhance its effect. Thus, the essence of the historical oaths is suspended till the end of the third paragraph.

Although amplified by numerous rhetorical devices, (such as alliteration: to friend and foe alike, parallelism: born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage, repetition: has been committed, we are committed, a paraphrased cliché: the torch has been passed, and an archaic construction: let the word go forth), the third paragraph is based on the enthymeme. It includes the following premises: Americans are heirs of the first revolution and its ideals; a new generation of Americans is committed to the preservation of human rights as to the initial American ideals; thus Americans remain committed to those initial ideals of the nation “at home and around the world”. This is not only the conclusion of the enthymeme. It is a proposition in The Inaugural Address to be upheld throughout it because war and tyranny, if they developed on the world scale, would annihilate human rights. This is the overall incentive of The Inaugural Address. It is amplified to become the concept of liberty in the following paragraph, which lays emphasis on the American commitment to liberty by a long parallelism (we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe), making the body of the paragraph. The commitment is reiterated as a pledge in an emphatic inverted structure standing all by itself. Thus the original conclusion of the enthymeme is turned into a promise, which activates the message of The Inaugural Address to the point of precipitous boldness.

The following major part of the Address is given over to the specification of the commitment of the United States to the nations of the world and international organisations. This section of the Address shows reasoning by the example. Every group of nations (the original European nations, the nations freed from colonialism, poverty stricken nations of the world, South American Republics, the United Nations and those nations “who would make themselves our adversary”) are addressed individually in emphatic parallel inverted syntactical structures. Each group of these nations, the poor and the United Nations are graced with elaborate descriptions rich in appealing qualifiers and metaphors. Therefore each group represents an example. The descriptions of all the groups contain references which ring a note of danger, i.e. which signify the presence of the opposing power. For example: meet a powerful challenge; one form of colonial control... to be replaced by a far greater iron tyranny; hostile powers, to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas; and to prevent it from becoming merely a forum of invective. Although the opposing power had been very well known, it was not referred to directly in the above quoted statements. It is only once, in connection with the poverty stricken peoples, that the intervening influence is given its proper name: the poor were promised help “not because the Communists may be doing it, ..., but because it is right”. Another point in the review of individual pledges which was made straight was America’s aversion to the activities of hostile powers in the Americas: And let every other power know that this hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house. The ample rhetorical devices foregrounded these direct statements, which, although direct, were very sparse in The Inaugural Address. Even at the crucial point of the review of individual pledges, both the proper name of the enemy and a statement in the indicative were avoided. The real and the irreconcilable enemy was addressed in the conditional: to those nations who would make themselves our adversary, we offer not a pledge but a request. This paragraph with a note of moderation introduces the second part of The Inaugural Address specifically given over to the reasoning over war and peace. The principal referent in this argument is “both sides” and the direct name of the adversary is avoided again. It is the permissible artistic vagueness in rhetoric which enables the indirect reference.

The reasoning in the second part of The Inaugural Address defies simple syllogistic analysis. The enthymeme and examples interchange, and the enthymeme is burdened with fact, reverse premises and rhetorical flourishes. For example: We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed. This periphrastic statement of power and peace, reminiscent of the classical maxim si vis pacem para bellum, was a very emphatic note. The implied allusion to the known maxim was as effective as the use of the maxim itself, recommended yet by Aristotle. But syllogistic reasoning is preserved in the following paragraph: neither side in two powerful groups of nations can find comfort in the conditions of the moment because both are alarmed by the spread of the atom and both are uncertain of their capacity to trigger “mankind’s final war” off. It is ample qualifiers, a detachment, tropes and the climax that turn the syllogism into the enthymeme in this one of many paragraphs consisting of a single statement.

The following paragraph, which emboldens both sides to a new start by the statement of conditions in a graceful logical antithesis, (civility is not a sign of weakness and sincerity is always subject to proof), concludes in an encouragement to negotiate boldly, which is expressed by a chiasmus in italics and opens up a series of invitations for co-operation. Every urge, embellished by poetic words and metaphors, is singled out in a separate paragraph. The string of invitations ends in a climactic generalising plea to beware of suspicion on both sides. The proposed new endeavour, in case of necessity, is voiced in fragments of the enthymeme framed in antitheses and parallelisms: the sought ideal is to be a new world of law which is to be ensured by the strong who are just and the weak who are secure, whilst the peace is to be preserved.

At this point the reasoning interchanges with a statement of the speaker’s awareness of time’s irreconcilable challenge to man’s efforts. Three climactic statements of the time the creation of the new world would require are italicised to show their significance. These statements require no argument and stand by virtue of the acknowledgement of the fact. A short and modest sentence, which even visually accomplishes the rhetoric of the paragraph, is an invitation to begin the work.

A consideration of the sharing of the duties with the countrymen in the endeavour on the world scale follows, and it begins the closing part of The Inaugural Address. It consists of poetic exemplifications and rhetorical questions. Following a verbal tribute to the Americans who fell in service for an international cause, a long statement summarises the contemporary situation and the ultimate cause in poetic terms. The cause is “a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself”. It is the first time that the word enemy appears in The Inaugural Address, in reference to the general privations of man. Although the actual enemy had been known throughout, it had been tentatively and indirectly referred to only by the poetic words foe and adversary in the previous deliberation on the issues of war and peace. An invitation to share duties in the struggle appears in a summary statement of the circumstances, in the following rhetorical questions, and, most of all, in the daring encouragement to defend “freedom in its hour of maximum danger”. It ends in praise of the energy, faith and devotion, which Americans put into their endeavour and which are expected to light their native country and, further, the world.

The end of The Inaugural Address distributes man’s duties and expectations in the turbulent world which precariously balances between war and peace. This gives sense and weight to what would otherwise be a few closing formal forms of address. All people, Americans and citizens of the world, are called to uphold the common cause, for only common efforts may preserve peace in the world. This idea in the closing address is a concealed enthymeme, which is extended by a consideration of duties. The duties are various, beginning with the national responsibility of the Americans and finishing with the freedom of man as a cause for the citizens of the world. Thus freedom frames up The Inaugural Address as a word and as a concept. The final note is very modern as it reverses the conventional resort to God’s will. Asking His blessing, the speaker demands the awareness “that here on earth God’s work must truly be” man’s own.

The argument by the enthymeme and example together with rhetorical devices empower The Inaugural Address with meaning which could not have been otherwise expressed at the time when the speaker was doing the impossible. When a single miscalculated word could have incensed the opposing power and could have caused most dangerous issues, it were the potentialities of rhetoric camouflaging the straight message that enabled the speaker to stretch the power of the word and, arguing intelligently, to deliberate the causes of the survival of mankind.

The Inaugural Address of J.F.Kennedy implies acute awareness of the speaker of the presence of the dangerous opponent on whose unpredictable judgement the world’s survival or end depended. It reveals the author’s wisely calculated expression measured by his insight and intelligence. Even the pledge made to the peoples of the world was calculated though poetic. But it also confirms the speaker’s responsibility and his argument of principle. The speaker was poetic in his deliberation of the precarious peace, of pledge and sacrifice. But he was point blank in his statement of America’s remaining “the master of its own house”. This indicates that the speaker represented an equal opponent rather than a supplicant. . With all the subtlety of expression, the Inaugural Address of J.F.Kennedy represented a person responsible for the world peace and proud of his own country, while the final statement made him sound as American as only an American can be.

Although The Inaugural Address of J.F.Kennedy was analysed for its parallelisms and antitheses, its allusions and intelligence, nobody assessed the actual influence of the Address on the minds and actions of the statesmen of the day. But the fact remains that the power and beauty of the word and the intelligence that The Inaugural Address contains impressed the minds of the world (cf.: Podell, Anzovin, 1988, 603-604), even though today some of its promises have been assessed critically as they had committed the USA to the Vietnam war (cf.: Cooke, 2000). But its rhetoric and argument significantly impressed the Americans of the day (cf.: Connolly, Levin, 1968, 216). Moreover, J.F.Kennedy himself was true to his pledge, especially when the crisis of the Caribbean was to be resolved. Finally, the world superpowers did achieve an agreement on disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons, even though almost three decades after the speaker’s assassination. In the circumstances, one can only add that The Inaugural Address of J.F.Kennedy, his sense of the power of the word, intelligence and diplomatic skill were a beacon “in the hard and bitter sixties”, the call of which has come true without an acknowledgement. At least it had definitely been a call toward the peace as the world has it at the turn of the millennium.

This is how rhetoric can indirectly influence the thought and action of the statesmen, the leading figures of the world and bring about a result. But rhetoric may have a considerable influence on the thought and action of the common people. It is political rhetoric, and its most significant influence may be realised on the electorate. Raising the question of whether democracy really works in modern presidential campaigns, Myron A. Levine, for example, treats the presidential race as “a curious combination of issue-based as well as personal image advertising” (Levine, 1997, 22). As is well known and as Mr Levine stresses, advertising in presidential campaigns consists of slogans and quotations from or associated with the candidate speeches or debates. They may be authentic citations, but may also be “exaggerations of political rhetoric” (Levine, 1997, 276). Television advertising is, in fact, the extension of rhetoric, but such is the means of the modern age, and it is the elector’s business to identify correctly the true to fact rhetorical extension.

There is a view that media campaigns in presidential elections are seldom issue-based, that candidates “are packaged by professional pollsters, media merchants and image consultants” and that voters are seldom “given meaningful information regarding the issue positions of the candidates” (Levine, 1997, 227). But if the voters cast their ballots “on the basis of manufactured personal imagery and fragments of incomplete, often misleading, issue information” (Levine, 1997, 227), democracy fails. Mr Levine argues that presidential campaigns are far from issueless and that, while image advertising persists, voters learn during the campaigns, too, not a bit from the nominees’ speeches. The paid advertisements inform rather than merely establish personal images of the candidates; they help voters “to discern the competing issue dispositions of the candidates” (Levine, 1997, 227). Moreover, the image merchants must work within the sharp confines of what voters already know and believe. It is from the media itself and from the speeches of the candidates that voters extract political information on such important matters as the state of the nation’s economy, the candidate’s experience and the incumbent president’s performance in office. Mr Levine argues that, irrespective of the means of the media, issue-based images win in presidential elections. He considers analytically the elections of 1988 and 1992, when President Bush and President Clinton won, respectively.

In his paper under consideration, Mr Levine first praises George Bush’s performance in delivering his acceptance speech as masterful. The pacing of his delivery was well made, with expressive pauses and appropriate gestures. It was a well prepared piece of rhetoric. In his speech Mr Bush noted the remarkable achievements of the Reagan legacy and introduced himself as Mr Reagan’s loyal vice president. In the rest of his speech, Mr Bush presented himself as his own man and attacked Mr Dukakis for opposing the death penalty and for failing to support the mandatory recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in schools. “He repeated his prior assault on Dukakis’s record on prison furloughs and taxes. His own position to taxes was clear, ”Read my lips. No new taxes’” He closed by leading the convention in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance” (Levine, 1997, 230).

Although Mr Bush’s acceptance speech was written not by himself but by Peggy Noonan, “the noted Reagan speechwriter whom the campaign had recruited to help in what had been a previously troubled area” (Levine, 1997, 230), it was a good speech. The above quotation also shows how much attention was paid to political rhetoric by the Bush side in the presidential campaign. One of the most important features of Bush’s speech was that it was “far from negative in its tone”. This means that it was addressed to intelligent audience who can discern information and who can be impressed by a responsible intelligent speaker. This was a subtly employed classical device. Bush reminded America of its strength and diversity, of its thousands of ethnic associations and voluntary and community organisations and their merits. He rhetorically likened the people to the stars twinkling in the heavens, “a thousand points of light” (Levine, 1997, 230). This was again a classical device when a speech is interspersed with bits of eulogy which is very appealing to the listeners. In dealing with personal imagery and personal experience, George Bush spoke of his moderate resources and life conditions in the State of Texas. This meant, by implication, that George Bush was one of the common Americans. It was not without Mr Bush’s acceptance speech that he was again leading in polls before the convention was over - the speech had passed the desired message to the public.

What later went on in the actual presidential campaign between Mr Bush and Mr Dukakis was considerably divided between accents on Mr Bush’s commitment to the above mentioned obligations, on the one hand, and on Mr Dukakis disloyalty to the Pledge of Allegiance in class, support to the nuclear freeze and gun control, opposition to the death penalty and prayer in schools, on the other. Mr Dukakis’s run was considerably weakened by the unfavourable environmental issues in his record - he “allowed Boston Harbor to become one of the filthiest city harbors in the nation”. But worst of all was Mr Dukakis’s record on prison furloughs: the point was Willie Horton, a black man’s story, who was a convicted murderer and not eligible for parole, but had been let out of Massachusetts prisons ten times on furlough. During his tenth furlough, Horton escaped to Maryland and committed new crimes against a white couple (Levine, 1997, 231). These questions, however, won lead for Mr Bush as a result of televised advertising rather than of political rhetoric. But emphasis on these issues in the campaign dialogue on Mr Bush’s side only added to his success which followed his rhetoric at the Republican convention.

In the paper under review, Mr Levine argues that Mr Bush’s side led in the campaign partly because paid-media especially effectively defined the campaign dialogue, while the Dukakis campaign did not initially choose to challenge the claims advanced by the Bush campaign (Levine, 1997, 235). Though the battle of professional image merchants was considerable in the 1988 election, there was sufficient and well presented information for voters to discern important policy differences between the candidates: even the negative ads helped voters to make out the competing action orientations of Mr Bush and Mr Dukakis in such issue areas as crime and defence spending, - concludes Mr Levine.

President George Bush’s Inaugural Address in 1989 can also be seen as a work of rhetoric of some influence. It was a call to the nation to stay united, kind, courageous and generous, while the President, who hoped for tolerance, could lead his government and the nation to “deeper successes that are made not of gold and silk, but of better hearts and finer souls”. America was said never to be wholly herself “unless she is engaged in high moral principle”, which in 1989, was to stand by those who “need our care, our guidance, and our education”. President Bush promised that the American leadership “will work hand in hand, encouraging, sometimes leading, sometimes being led, rewarding… will work on this in the White House (and) in the Cabinet agencies” while addressing the people and every member of the government to have the old and timeless ideas reborn.

This is why President Bush’s Inaugural Address could have had influence on the Americans. The Inaugural Address of 1989 was a speech which integrated the structural model of President John F.Kennedy’s address, and for good reason. The keynote subjects in it were a commemoration of the Bicentennial Inauguration with an allusion to George Washington, Father of the country, a prayer to the Heavenly Father, an overview of the political situation in the world while introducing a metaphor “a new breeze is blowing”, a review of American ideals and the state of the country, obligations of the President and of an organised Nation like “a thousand points of light”. Highlighting the difficulties of the country in this review, President Bush intended to address “the people and the programs that are the brighter points of light” with the hope of “a new engagement between the Executive and the Congress” and to thrash out the challenges “with the House and the Senate”. This was followed by a reference to the changed Congress and “the final lesson of Vietnam” and by a word of devotion to “my friends”, (which was a regular form of address in this Inaugural Address), and to the world. Obligations of great nations, international relations (with the former arch enemy), the commitment to the citizens and to the American children with a note that the work starts tomorrow concluding and winding up the Inaugural Address.

The above mentioned topics show that President Bush’s Inaugural Address echoed thematically and structurally President Kennedy’s Inaugural Address. Paragraphs 7, 9, 10, 14, 19, 20 and 21 remind even literally of the respective parts in President Kennedy’s Inaugural Address. Key words, some which recur, such as: peace, Your work, a moment rich with promise, great nations of the world, passed from generation to generation, that war, a deadly bacteria, Let us negotiate soon and hard. But in the end let us produce, Our challenges are great, but our will is greater and others associate literally with president Kennedy’s words. One can also compare the rhetorical structure in the following: For the first time in this century, for the first time in perhaps all history, man does not have to invent a system by which to live. I take as my guide the hope of a saint: In crucial things, unity; in important things, diversity; in all things, generosity.

A major difference is the length of the two Inaugural Addresses and a few recurrent words: in the Inaugural Address of 1961 foe and adversary were the important though not abused words, while in that of 1989, friends is the key word. Bearing in mind these analogies and differences, even a foreigner can appreciate the tightly disciplined word in the short Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy, and a freer word in President George Bush’s Inaugural Address. The extralinguistic conditions and the rhetorical devices highlight the sense of President Bush’s Inaugural Address: it commemorated not only the Bicentennial Inauguration but also the Inauguration of twenty-eight years ago. This is the time within the living memory of today’s Americans. This is also the time at which the United States of America managed to guide the world over the precipitous balance of powers. In this context, President Bush’s recurrent metaphor the new breeze (is blowing) acquires sense as it marks a new stage in world history, which the United States of America oversees again among other major countries. All these words and patterns, allusions and metaphors should have fallen on sensitive ears in America, the more so that President Bush’s Inaugural Address touched upon specific American problems in the word no less influential.

The 1992 campaign was different. The nation’s prolonged economic slump was the issue, and the nation was concerned “with the health of the economy, not Clinton’s personal history or George Bush’s foreign policy experience and success” (Levine, 1997, 272). But Mr Bush’s campaign was not moderate or thoroughly fair. By the end, the Bush campaign “was reduced essentially to a series of aggressive, negative attacks on Clinton’s character and record” (Levine, 1997, 272). This was supported in the media by fragments of utterances of various men and women in the street “who repeatedly attacked Clinton’s lack of trustworthiness and integrity” (Levine, 1997, 272). This was neither political rhetoric nor the candidate’s words, while the personal vilification of Bill Clinton continued presenting reminiscences of his student days, his visit to the Soviet Union and the supposed aid to the Communists. The charges against Mr Clinton as a governor of Arkansas were supported by the biased presentation of facts and landscapes. Clinton ads, consequently, provided alternative facts that highlighted Mr Clinton’s record of managerial success. Finally Mr Bush’s biased ads did not appear convincing to the voters who had come to understand “that the apparently factual claims in the ad were the exaggeration of political rhetoric” (Levine, 1997, 276). The Clinton campaign responded with ads of its own, with emphasis on Clinton’s proposal to cut taxes for the sort of people featured in Bush’s ad. But what was most effective was that Mr Clinton’s forces returned to more positive themes and the influential support to him, while the essentially negative words from the Bush’s side finally hurt Mr Bush no less than Mr Clinton. This usage came close to the dictum of the classical rhetoric not to assault the opponent directly or in the first person, which is bad taste and may have a negative influence, as is known from Aristotle’s treatise.

Mr Bush’s attempt “to make the 1992 election a referendum on Bill Clinton’s personal character” failed (Levine, 1997, 277). The public who had learned the bitter experience of the failing economy focused, naturally, on the nation’s economic well-being rather than on the personalities of the nominees. The 1992 election resolved around issues, and the democratic principles proved to be effective. In this case, political rhetoric which focused on factual information was also more successful. One is involuntarily reminded of the dictum of Cato the Senior in rhetoric: “Rem tene, verba sequentur” (Possess the content, words themselves will follow). Only minding the circumstances, the context of the 1992 election in the USA and the issues, one tends to paraphrase the dictum on this occasion into: Rem tene, populus sequentur.

As was the opinion of Plato (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 268a) and Aristotle (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, 10-30) that rhetoric is a powerful means of persuasion. The effect of political rhetoric is directly evident in the decision of voters as they cast their ballots. And though, in modern times, political rhetoric is considerably diluted by media advertising which, if especially excessive, tends to dull the senses rather than sharpen them, rhetoric remains effective. Factual information, especially if aptly presented and with the relevant rhetorical flourish, wins the minds of people more readily than the pressurised slogans, ads and beaten quotations. If the information is positive in itself, its effect, according to the classical dictum, is still greater. But the influence of political rhetoric on thought and action, in whatever direction, can never be denied. Like in the times of the classical antiquity, the emphatic negative emphasis proves to have the opposite effect. The classical dicta find proof in modern times again and again. Following Plato in Socrates’s words (Plato, 1996, Phaedrus, 272d-e), one may be certain that long and winding reasoning is not necessary in rhetoric. The important thing is persuasion and the insight of the politician: he who can find convincing facts and words is very likely to win the public over to his side.

The ceremonial rhetoric is less recorded in modern times and it is hard to measure its influence on thought with the respective proof at hand. With its power of persuasion and influence on thought and action, rhetoric has one more application in the modern world. It is the prospective employment of rhetoric in the teaching of writing. This is a truly prospective application of rhetoric because its elements are presented with the idea to aid prospective writers and make their compositions convincing and effective.

Rhetoric changed from spoken oratory into written speeches yet in the classical antiquity. At first rhetoric existed as oral speeches made in assemblies and public places (genus symbouleutikon). There were also speeches in the Senate and in the law courts. There existed written speeches, too. Thus rhetoric came to be reflected in written speeches as if they were a kind of journalism. This way deliberative rhetoric (genus symbouleutikon) got transferred into any other kind of text, even into poetry. Ovid, for example, employed rhetoric in his works. Rhetoric is encountered in the classical tragedies and comedies (Zabulis, 1995, VI).

Similarly in the United States at least, rhetoric was studied in the old sense of the word, i.e. as the spoken discourse, in the time of Washington and Jefferson. This practice has changed of late and rhetoric today is studied alongside with composition, as the principles of correct and effective writing (Davidson, 1968, 2). This practice assumes the concept of rhetoric different from that in the classical antiquity. “Composition refers chiefly to structural arrangement, organisation, the putting together of parts to make a whole”, while “rhetoric refers to the skill or artifice used in making the composition persuasive and effective” (Davidson, 1968, 2). Thus rhetoric has come to mean the skilful use of verbal means of persuasion rather than totally the art of persuasion. Nevertheless even in this sense rhetoric has remained the art of persuasion or an art in a limited sense of the word.

The study and application of rhetoric in the sense defined above requires first of all the knowledge of a language, which is systematic and discriminating. The student has to know the reason of grammatical prescriptions and to differentiate what meaning and relationship different grammatical means convey. He has not only to possess the knowledge of a language but become skilled in commanding his resources. Thus he has to be proficient in the art of verbal usage.

Rhetoric in the new sense means the training of one’s mind which may be achieved in traditional ways. Every student has two resources in his study of rhetoric - the individual and the traditional. The individual resources are made up of one’s inborn gifts and education, while the traditional resources include the existing verbal means of a language and the accepted grammatical tradition of the language, plus its literary heritage. The principal means and sources that aid the student are therefore the dictionary, the textbook and the works of British and American writers who have shaped the literary tradition. In the study of rhetoric reading is so important as to perfect the student’s skill in usage and train his mind and taste. Yet, to become skilled in effective writing the student has to practise writing. To begin successfully, the best modern authors suggest that, following the mode of the classical rhetoric, the student has to begin with the subject or sphere with which he is well familiar (Davidson, 1968, 5).

Authors who deal with composition as a separate subject (Davidson, 1968), discuss such matters as the problem, the guiding purpose, the unity of composition, its coherence, and the order of presentation (the natural and the logical), paragraphing, transition, proportion and emphasis. Having settled these questions, kinds of writing (the expository, the descriptive, the narrative, and the argumentative) are considered, within which definition, analysis, argumentation and other processes are explained. As has been mentioned above, kinds of writing are subjects which belong to the matter of modern rhetoric, because they substitute for the extralinguistic matters which used to be the integrated content of rhetoric in the antiquity.

Apart from these macro components, there are the micro components or the elements which make the art of the skilful use of language. The verbal components that are offered for study are the paragraph, the sentence and the vocabulary. In the teaching of writing, the linguistic questions as the essence of modern rhetoric are dealt with analytically and with precision. Such treatment of the material does not only serve its purpose when used. It trains the mind of the learner, too, so that he becomes keenly perceptive and discriminating not only in verbal matters but also in the subjects of the content of his compositions. This is also one of the influences of rhetoric: “... one of the great rewards of a course in composition and rhetoric is that it increases a student’s understanding and appreciation of books and ideas. Whether he learns to write brilliantly or just moderately well, he will have a keener eye for all sorts of writing than if he had never himself attempted to write at all” (Davidson, 1968, 5). A learner with the mind thus shaped is likely to influence his audience by making his language really persuasive. Can there be a better testimony of the influence of modern rhetoric? If such a writer is successful, can there be more obvious evidence that language does influence one’s intellect and mind?

The teaching of rhetoric in modern times with the goal of perfecting writing is well developed in numerous manuals. It is only questions of style that yet require accomplishment in modern rhetoric (cf., though, Daniel, 1967). But the important point about this practice is that, like the potential meaning of English or its analytic clarity, the teaching of rhetoric influences the mind of the student to make it disciplined and intelligent. This influence is so great that a successful student of modern rhetoric can rival professional speech writers and experienced speakers who have the minds influenced and disciplined as much. The keenness of their minds make these speakers and writers deft with their arguments, selective in the motives of reasoning and vigorous in proof. The successful speaker and writer has to have his mind so intelligent and alert, which shows in his communication even in other spheres.

Otherwise the influence of rhetoric is pragmatic - the listeners either take or refuse to take the speaker’s advice and respectively modify their actions. But the influence of rhetoric is great because numerous authors advise the listeners always to be attentive and intelligent and to sort out the speaker’s arguments. The advice is to be suspicious of too much stress on emotions, of too weak arguments and of too little attention to the subject matter. These fallacies traced, the listeners are likely to reject the overdone appeal of the speaker and escape his undesirable influence.

Aristotle condemned those who may abuse their power of speaking against those who cannot speak for themselves. This power happens to be abused today. Brainwashing is a familiar concept, especially in China, the former Soviet Union and the United States. Brainwashing means so intensive and so thorough indoctrination that it effects a radical transformation of beliefs and mental attitudes (cf.: Lifton, 1968). Public speaking today is the activity which allows the practice of brainwashing and, unless the speaker argues fairly, such rhetoric is a harmful activity. Even the common people in the United States, for instance, are familiar with the practice of brainwashing and can guard themselves against such speakers. Advertising and the Internet have strengthened the process, and the phrase “You’re a victim of advertising” is little short of the meaning of brainwashing.

With the integrity of rhetoric in the classical sense declining, rhetoric is still very powerful today, especially among statesmen and, in some countries, among lawyers. There are authors who maintain that the power of the president is the power to persuade. In such countries like the United States this power is well used.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the famous authors Charles K. Ogden and Ivor A. Richards argued passionately against the abuse of the emotive uses of language and the pollution of communication (Ogden, Richards, 1960/1923). Rhetoric is a sphere in which the emotive use of language has a significant role to play and may be abused. But this disbalance is well known and explained today, to what Ogden and Richards had addressed their efforts. Intelligent communication requires intelligence from the listeners in public speaking no less than from the speakers. The use of language matters considerably therefore. One of the reasons of the influence of rhetoric is a multitude of the means of expression, which do not bypass common words and collocations. Rhetoric exploits ordinary uses of words no less than various stylistic devices. This latter aspect does not entail rich original resources. In order to facilitate understanding perception and influence, public speakers exploit the typical patterns of emphasis, borrowed metaphors and even clichés. Ordinary usage and a few obvious metaphors and similes are distinct in President’s George Bush’s Inaugural Address, while more sophisticated figures and tropes are characteristic of President’s John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address. Rhetoric is truly located between the referential and the emotive uses of language, i.e. between routine and literary usage. It exploits both conceptual words and tropes with figures. It is a truly mixed use of language in which the emotive use is prominent. Provided this condition, rhetoric which abuses the emotive use of language and certain means of argumentation is likely to be repudiated by the audience. It is this consciousness and intelligence that Ogden and Richards hoped for to straighten out the channels of communication and to exploit verbal communication, including rhetoric, for its right purposes. Minding the advice of the classics and the views of modern authors, rhetoric cannot be treated as a leisurely activity. Because of the potential of persuasion and the power of its influence, only keen and intelligent listeners can take the orator’s advice wisely and withstand their own in cases of the abuse of the power of speaking. Rhetoric, in which the power of words and psychology combine, is likely to fail only with inexpert speakers. In all other cases, rhetoric always exerts its influence, as this final remark on the critical intelligence of the listeners confirms it one extra time.

56 So much emphasis on persuasion through the enthymeme in rhetoric here means not only that rhetoric was essentially persuasive rather than demonstrative to Aristotle, but also that this is the essential which many authors, who had written before Aristotle, overlooked. Aristotle himself saw this point as a major merit of his treatise.

57 The enthymeme is a sort of syllogism... (Aristotle, 1954, Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 1, 1355a, 5-10), in which one of the premises is not explicitly stated (Blackburn, 1996, 121)

58 To show how philosophical Aristotle is, the most philosophical of all authors on rhetoric (Zabulis, 1995, VI), how integrated rhetoric and legal matters were in the antiquity and how expository and argumentative writing with all the elements of reasoning interweave in Rhetoric, this work will be reviewed quite accurately.